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THE FOREIGN TRADE ASPECTS OF THE TRADE ACT OF
1974, PART I
The Trade Act of 19741 is a piece of major legislation which will
have a substantial effect on the international trade of the United
States for many years to come. The most immediate importance of
this legislation is that it gives authority to a Special Trade Represent-
ative of the United States (STR) to participate in the current multi-
lateral trade negotiations (MTN) under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 It also provides the Administration with
** The second part of this article will appear in 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
No. 3, Summer 1976.
1 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 101-613, 88 Stat. 1978-2077 (Codified
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487. Supp. IV, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Trade Act, with
section numbers corresponding to the session laws]. A full list of abbreviations is set
out at the end of this article.
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
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broad authority to react to actions of foreign nations or entities which
adversely affect or discriminate against the foreign trade of the
United States. The Trade Act further instructs the Administration
to attempt to revise GATT in major respects and makes federal assis-
tance much more readily available to employees who become unem-
ployed because of foreign imports. To a lesser extent it makes federal
assistance available to businesses and communities who suffer from
foreign imports. The Act also endeavors to remedy what is perceived
by many as a social injustice-the restrictions by Communist coun-
tries on the emigration of Jews from those countries.
This article will attempt to:
(1) discuss the legislative history of the Trade Act-a fascinat-
ing example of the interplay between the Congress and the Adminis-
tration on a most critical subject;
(2) compare the Trade Act with the Trade Expansion Act of
19621 (hereinafter called "the 1962 Act")-the most recent major leg-
islation of the United States dealing with the same general subject
matter;
(3) discuss briefly the negotiability of certain of the objectives
of the Trade Act; and
(4) present a detailed discussion of the Trade Act.
INTRODUCTION
The statistics regarding U.S, trade and balance of payments con-
tained in the Report of the Committee on Finance of the Senate on
the Trade Act 4 (the SFC Report) show clearly the deterioration of the
United States balance of trade during the years 1965-74 (and particu-
43 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (January 1, 1948). The "authentic text"
of GATT is not easily determined if one elects to start with the original agreement and
work forward. This results in part from the number of textual amendments that have
been made, in part from the extremely extensive "schedules of concessions," a separate
such schedule existing for each party, and in part from the fact that the number of
contracting parties has increased from eight as of January 1, 1948 to eighty-three as of
November 1, 1974. However, for purposes of this article the text of the general provi-
sions of the General Agreement (that is, the general articles (article I through XXXVIII
and the annexes, exclusive of the schedules) will be sufficient. That text as published
in March 1969 is set out at Volume IV, page 1, of GAT publication IV GATT, BAsIc
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 1 et. seq. (1969). No amendment to this gen-
eral language has occurred since that text was developed. That text is also set out in
J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 800 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
JACKSON].
19 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. (1970).
S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1231 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186 [hereinafter cited as SFC REPORT].
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larly in the years 1970-74) as compared to the years 1960-64. 5 The
average annual U.S. balance of trade, for the years 1960-64, on the
basis normally used in government statistics,' was a surplus of $5.4
billion. The average annual U.S. balance of trade for the years 1965-
69 on the same basis declined to a surplus of $3.1 billion; and in the
period of January 1, 1970 to September 30, 1974, the balance of trade
declined much more sharply to an average annual deficit of $1.6
billion.
During the same period, the U.S. balance of payments on a
liquidity basis, excluding "special drawing rights' 7 allocations in
U.S. TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. 1960.74
[In billions of dollars)
U.S trade position Trade balance Balance of payments
Exports Xl Imports ,M) C.A f. 0M
excluding Offictal
Minas foreign settle. Basis
Total foreign aid F.o.b. C.i.f.* Fo.b. id(X) Liquidity"
°  
ments balance
1960 19.7 18.0 151 16.3 46 1.7 -3.7 -3.4 -1.2
1961 20.2 18.5 14,8 16.0 5.5 2.5 -2.3 -1.3 (3)
1962 21.0 189 16.5 17.6 45 1.1 -29 -2.6 -1.0
196.1 225 20.0 17.2 186 53 1.4 -2.7 -1.9 -1.3
1964 256 23.1 18.7 20.3 7.1 2.8 -2.7 -1.5 -. 1
1965 26.7 24.3 21.4 23.2 5.3 1.1 -25 -1.3 -1.6
1966 29.5 27.0 25.6 27.7 39 -. 7 -2.2 .2 -2.1
1967 31.0 29.5 26.9 28.8 4.1 -. 3 -4.7 -3.4 -3.7
1968 34.1 31.8 33.2 353 .8 -3.5 -1.6 -1.6 -1.9
1969 37.3 35.3 36.0 38.2 1.3 -2.9 -6.1 2.7 -3.6
1970 42.7 40.7 400 42.4 2.7 -1.7 -3.9 -9.8 -3.8
1971 435 41.7 45.6 48.3 -2.0 -6.6 -22.0 -39.6 -196
1972 49.2 47.5 55.6 58.9 -6.4 -11.4 -13.9 -104 -11.2
1973 708 69.4 69.5 732 1.7 -3.8 -7.8 -53 -. 9
1974C
I 22.4 21.7 23.2 -.7 -1.0 1. 1.7
II 24.2 45.6 25.2 27.0 -. 9 -4.6 -6.2 -4.5 -2.7
I1 25.0 24.7 27.1 29.0 -2.1 -43 ... NA NA
"C if. imports for the years 1960-66 are assumed to be roughly (1968. 6 1 percent (1969). 6.2 percent (1970. 6.1 percent (1971)
equixalent to 108.3 percent of f.o.b. imports inaccordance with a and 5.9 percent for 1972 and 1973.
Bureau of Customs-Tariff Commission-Bureau of Census tudy "*The liquidity and official settlements deficits for 1966.7
based on 1966 arrivals. For the years 1967-73 estimates are based on excludes SDR aliocatons.
Bureau of Customs-Bureau of Census tudies showing estimated *-1Less than $50 million.
freight and insurance charges to be 6.9 percent (1967). 6.3 percent
I U.S. Government statistics normally include foreign aid shipments as part of
U.S. exports and normally show the value of imports on an f.o.b. foreign factory basis,
rather than on a c.i.f. basis.
The SFC Report states the "most meaningful and accurate basis" of measuring
trade "would include the cost of insurance and freight in the value of our imports and
exclude the soft-currency and other foreign-aid-financed shipments from the value of
our exports." (Emphasis added.) SFC Report, supra note 4, at 7. The table set forth
in note 5, supra, shows the effect of these two adjustments, which is of course to reduce
the trade surplus (or increase the trade deficit) in any given year.
7 Special drawing rights are the rights given to the members of the International
Monetary Fund by a 1970 amendment. Each member is entitled to the special drawing
right which is proportionate to its quota in the Fund. A member may utilize the SDR
under certain conditions to reduce or eliminate its balance of payments' difficulties.
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1966-73, worsened from a relatively small average annual deficit in
the years 1960-64 of $2.8 billion to a larger average annual deficit of
$3.4 billion in the years 1965-69, and soared to an average annual
deficit of $11.5 billion in the period between January 1, 1970, and
September 30, 1974.
The position of the United States as the leader in world trade has
been significantly eroded over this fifteen year period, and the posi-
tions of the EEC and Japan have significantly improved.' During the
last five years, the United States has been forced to devalue its cur-
rency several times, has imposed and removed tariff surcharges, has
imposed and removed profit controls, and has imposed and removed
export controls on various products in short supply.9
At the same time, the OPEC countries, by withholding supplies
of petroleum and drastically increasing its price have greatly inflated
the cost of imports to most of the developed and less developed coun-
tries of the Free World. In the views of most Western economists,
these actions have greatly accelerated the inflation already prevalent
in many Western countries. Other groups of commodity-producing
countries, inspired by the tremendous success of the OPEC countries,
have endeavored to apply their example to other commodities.
During the last ten year period, on the other hand, there have
been several major developments which in the long run may prove to
be most helpful to increased trade between the United States and
Communist countries:
(a) The United States has very substantially reduced its ex-
port controls on trade between the United States and almost
all Communist countries (other than Vietnam, North Korea
and Cuba);
(b) The United States has concluded a trade agreement"
with the Soviet Union, but that agreement will not enter into
force until the prescribed congressional procedure has been
carried out;" and
(c) Considerable progress has been made in developing trade
with the People's Republic of China.
The initial declaration relating to a further round of multilateral
trade negotiations (MTN) was issued at a meeting of the ministers
8 See Tables and Statistical Material on U.S. Balance of Trade and Balance of
Payments, S. REP. No. 254, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
1 It is true that the U.S. balance of trade has sharply improved during the last
two years, but this improvement occurred after congressional action on the Trade Bill.
" 67 Department State Bull. 592 (1972).
" Trade Act, § 407(c)(2).
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of the members of GATT held in Tokyo in September, 1973.12 A Trade
Negotiations Committee for the Tokyo round of negotiations met for
the first time in October, 1973. It is composed of 64 countries who are
members of GATT and of 19 non-members.' 3 As a result of the earlier
"Kennedy" round of trade negotiations under GATT (1962-67), the
average level of customs duties on nonagricultural products has been
very substantially reduced for most of the major trading countries of
the Free World. Granted that the "average" level of customs duties
for any country is a difficult and complex calculation, it is generally
accepted that as a result of the Kennedy round, the average level of
customs duties of non-agricultural products (other than mineral






"Average" duty levels do not, of course, accurately indicate the ex-
tent of protection where a country has a wide dispersion of duty rates.
Although the Kennedy round resulted in substantial reductions in
the highest duty rates, it is still fair to say that with the possible
exception of Japan, the Unied States retains more high-level customs
duty rates than any of the other major trading countries.
It is now generally believed that non-tarriff measures (NTM),
rather than customs duties, are the major barrier to international
trade.' 5 Perhaps the simplest and most inclusive definition of an
NTM is that given by Professor Stanley Metzger:
In general, all regulations of trade other than ordinary rates of
duty imposed on ordinary classifications of articles valued ac-
cording to customary methods can be considered nontariff bar-
riers to the extent that they can be, and often are, used to
12 GATr Press Release No. GATT/1134 (Sept. 14, 1973).
, GATT Press Release No. GATI'/1136 (Oct. 29, 1973).
" See E. PREEG, TRADERS AND DiPorMATs 208-211 (1970). The above percentages
assumed that the tentative agreement on the elimination of the "American selling
price" method of valuation would be approved by Congress. See notes 25-26, infra.
This agreement was not approved by Congress, but this is not believed to affect the
average rates to any substantial degree.
" S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRIERS 2 (1974).
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interdict trade for protectionist purposes-to protect, in added
degree, domestic industry against competitive imports.,,
Thus, the United States and many of the other GATT members
perceive an opportunity in this round of negotiations to negotiate for
the elimination of many of the existing NTMs and to amend or sup-
plement GATT so that its provisions will deal adequately with the
rights and remedies of members of GATT as to the remaining NTMs.
Despite the general agreement on this point, the negotiations will
probably reach their highest level of tension and disagreement over
these NTM's. What is to one nation a reasonable precaution,
prompted by a desire to safeguard the health of its citizens, may
appear to its trading partners as a major barrier to trade, with the
"health" argument a transparent subterfuge.
Finally in analyzing the Trade Act, two other critical points, both
relating to the attitude of the United States Congress to GATT, must
be borne in mind:
(1) Congress has never been whole-heartedly in sympathy
with GATT or in general with the negotiations carried out
thereunder insofar as they related to the United States. In-
deed, in six separate Trade Agreement Acts, including Section
121(d) of the Trade Act, Congress insisted upon the insertion
of the following provision (or ones very similar to it): "The
enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine or
indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the
Executive Agreement known as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade."'
7
(2) Specifically, many of the leaders of the present Congress
have come to feel that the result of the most recent MTN
(those carried out during the Kennedy round) was highly unfa-
vorable to the United States.'"
,Id. at 7.
" Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, § 10, 65 Stat. 75 (1951).
, Consider, for example, the following paragraphs of the SFC REPORT, p. 15:
Twelve years have passed since the Congress enacted the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. A great amount of international economic
history has occurred in the intervening years. In the opinion of the
Committee, much of that history has been unfavorable to this coun-
try, largely because of the antiquated rules of the international trade
and monetary systems and the related lack of genuine cooperation and
reciprocity in international economic relations.
The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations brought about some of
the largest tariff reductions in the history of the United States. Unfor-
tunately, the Kennedy Round did not remedy fundamental inequities
in the world trading system. There was no reform of the institutional
1976]
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DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE TRADE ACT
The Trade Act of 1974 found its inception in the Trade Bill for-
warded by President Nixon to the Congress on April 10, 1973. This
bill was introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 6767 by
Mr. Wilbur Mills and others.'9 The House Ways and Means Commit-
tee then proceeded to hold extensive hearings on the bill in May and
June, 1973. These hearings elicited many proposed amendments, and
the staff of the Committee prepared a listing of those amendments. 0
The report of the Committee (hereinafter referred to as "HWMC
Report") recommended H.R. 10710 to the House. 2' The Committee
based its bill on the Administration Proposal, but it modified that
proposal in many respects. One of the amendments introduced by the
Committee which was to cause controversy and considerable delay
was the provision to give the President authority to extend most-
favored-nation treatment to a Communist country only if he deter-
mined that the country in question permitted its citizens the right to
emigrate without payment of fees or taxes.
The House Ways and Means Committee had made a thorough
study of the bill, and perhaps under more normal circunstances, the
Senate Finance Committee would have accepted H.R. 10710 without
making major amendments. However, circumstances which inter-
vened between the issuance of the HWMC Report on October 10,
1973 and the issuance of the SFC Report on November 26, 1974 were
far from normal.
The OPEC oil embargo, the dramatic increase in the price of oil,
rampant inflation, critical shortages of many commodities, and other
factors all combined to cause a major economic upheaval during this
precise period of time. In addition, the United States had been almost
completely unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain any concerted action
from its major trading partners in Europe and the Far East in re-
sponse to the oil embargo. Many of these countries sought to work out
their individual solutions with one or more of the OPEC countries. It
was therefore most natural and appropriate for the Senate Finance
structure, nor was there any significant progress in dealing with non-
tariff barriers or distortions of international trade. Our trading part-
ners, most notably the European Community, devised new ways to
pursue protectionism, particularly in agriculture.
" H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See H.R. Doc. No. 478, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) (This document also includes the Press Release issued at that time, the
Message of the President, the Summary of the Bill, and a section by section analysis
of the Bill).
20 HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, BRIEFING PAPER No. 8: LISTING OF AMEND-
MENTS PROPOSED TO H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1973).
1, H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as HWMC
REPORT].
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Committee to make a fresh and intensive review of the proposed
Trade Bill in light of these dramatic new circumstances. The Trade
Act which has emerged is a lengthy document of ninety-nine printed
pages as compared to the forty-two page Administration Proposal. In
addition the Trade Act is, by necessity, complex, reflecting the some-
times conflicting desires of the Congress and the Administration, of
"free traders" and protectionists, and of representatives of business
and labor.
The Act is divided into six basic titles, as follows:
I-Negotiating and Other Authority
11-Relief from Injury Caused by Import Competition
rI-Relief from Unfair Trade Practice
IV-Trade Relations with Countries Not Currently Receiv-
ing Nondiscriminatory Treatment
V-Generalized System of Preferences
VI-General Provisions.
These titles are basically the same as those contained in the
Administration's Proposal but the Congress has altered the Adminis-
ration's Proposal in major respects.
Statement of Purposes
The Statement of Purposes of the 1974 Trade Act"2 (Section 2)
may be summarized as follows:
(i) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in
the United States. ..;
(ii) to reduce or eliminate barriers to trade on a basis which
assures "substantially equivalent competitive opportunities
for the United States";
(iii) to establish fairness and equity in international trade,
including the reform of GATT;
(iv) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American
industry and labor against unfair or injurious import competi-
tion, and to assist workers, firms and communities to adjust
to changes in international trade flows;
(v) to open market opportunities for United States commerce
in nonmarket economies; and
(vi) to provide fair and reasonable access to products of less
developed countries in the United States market.
A comparison of the Statement of Purposes of the Trade Act with
" 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (Supp. IV 1974).
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that contained in the Administration Proposal brings out two signifi-
cant differences. First, in the Trade Act Statement of Purposes, the
emphasis in each paragraph, except the last, is on the benefits to be
obtained for the United States. The wording of the Statement of
Purposes included in the Administration's Proposal is much more
general and stresses the advantages to be gained by all countries
through elimination of barriers to international trade. Second, in the
Trade Act Statement of Purposes, all references to the powers of the
President are struck out. These differences in approach in the State-
ment of Purposes are but the harbingers of the many specific and
substantial changes contained in the subsequent provisions of the
Act, as compared to those of the Administration Proposal.
Title I-Negotiating and Other Authority
Chapter L Rates of Duty and Other Trade Barriers
Section 101. Basic Authority for Trade Agreements.
Section 101 is the basic authority to negotiate and agree on the
lowering of customs duties and is therefore one of the most important
authorities granted to the President. It gives the President the au-
thority to enter into trade agreements during a five year period and
to modify or continue existing duties or duty-free status, or to impose
additional duties as he deems necessary or appropriate to carry out
these agreements. The Administration Proposal had requested this
authority but without any limitation either as to decreases or in-
creases. The Congress was unwilling, however, to give such broad
authority, and the President's authority to decrease duties is limited
to 40% of the rates in effect on January 1, 1975; but this limitation
does not apply to items carrying a duty rate of 5% or less as of that
date. Furthermore, the President may not increase duties more than
the higher of (a) 50% above the rate in colume 2 of the Tariff Sched-
ules as in effect on January 1, 1975, (actually this is the rate in effect
on July 1, 1934) or (b) a rate which is 20% ad valorem above the rate
existing on January 1, 1975. These limitations are generally the same
as those contained in the 1962 Act," except that the authority in that
Act to reduce duties extends to 50% (rather than 60%) of the then-
existing rate. Furthermore, the authority to reduce duties under Sec-
tion 101 of the Trade Act is subject to a complicated staging and
rounding formula (set out in Section 109).24
19 U.S.C. § 1821 (1970).
24 The 1962 Act also continued a staging formula (19 U.S.C.A. § 1883) but it
required staging over only a four year period.
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The staging formula will not have a major effect as to most articles
because the U.S. average duty rate has already been reduced to ap-
proximately 10%. Thus, the aggregate reduction on 10% items would
be limited to 6%, and the staging requirement would limit the initial
reduction to 3% with the remaining 3% reduction taking effect one
year later. On the other hand, the staging requirement would have a
substantial effect on an item bearing an ad valorem duty rate of 60%
at January 1, 1975. The aggregate reduction possible would be 36%,
but this would have to take place over at least a nine year period
after the initial reduction.
Section 102. Nontariff Barriers to and Other Distortions of Trade
This Section states that Congress finds NTM's are reducing the
growth of foreign markets for products of United States agriculture,
industry, mining, and commerce, ". . . adversely affecting the
United States economy, preventing fair and equitable access to sup-
plies . . .," and urges the President "to take all appropriate and
feasible steps within his power . . . to harmonize, reduce, or elimi-
nate such barriers to . . .international trade." The President is also
authorized to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries
providing for the harmonization, reduction or elimination of NTMs'
subject to express approval by the Congress of any such agreement.
This Section does not purport to give any general definition of
NTM's. Indeed, except for the title of the Section, which specifically
indicates that it deals with nontariff barriers, one could easily inter-
pret the Section as including normal customs tariffs.n It seems clear,
however, both from the title of the Section, and from the committee
reports,2 1 that the Section is intended to deal only with nontariff
barriers or distortions.
In general, the opening subsection of Section 102 is quite similar
to the comparable subsection of the Administration's Proposal, ex-
cept that the Senate added the clause "preventing fair and equitable
access to supplies." This Section, when compared to Sections 1821(a)
and 1882(b)(1) of the 1962 Act, shows the much greater emphasis
placed by the Trade Act on the need for dealing with NTM's during
the present negotiations and arriving at an agreement satisfactory to
Congress with respect to them.
At first glance, the basic authority for trade agreements set forth
21 Section 601(a) defines "import restriction" as a limitation or exaction other
than a duty but Section 102 does not use the phrase "import restriction."
2' See SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 22; HWMC REPORT, supra note 21, at 20.
19761
336 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
in the 1962 Act appears to be worded broadly enough to cover not only
trade agreements dealing with tariff barriers, but also non-tariff bar-
riers. There was, however, considerable disagreement on this point
after the 1962 Act was passed. Certain members of Congress took the
position that the 1962 Act did not authorize the President to enter
into any binding trade agreement dealing with the American Selling
Price27 method of valuation of imports or other non-tariff barriers to
trade generally; and the STR agreed, at least with regard to the
American Selling Price.2
The procedure for obtaining the approval of Congress contained
in the Trade Act differs in several respects with that contained in the
Administration Proposal. The Administration Proposal had sought to
obtain a complete delegation of authority from Congress to negotiate
and agree upon certain types of NTM's,2 9 as follows:
(a) Customs methods of valuation (which would presumably
have included American Selling Price);3"
2 The "American Selling Price" method of valuation is explained briefly in note
30, infra.
21 As a part of the Kennedy round negotiations, a special agreement on chemicals,
Geneva Protocol to the General Agreement, done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 6425, 620-629, U.N.T.S., was entered into providing for a reduction of European
chemical duties if and when the Congress agreed to eliminate the American Selling
Price valuation method. The Kennedy administration and succeeding administrations
endeavored to obtain congressional implementation of this special agreement but the
Senate Finance Committee refused to agree.
23 Administration Proposal § 103(c) at 26.
20 The "American Selling Price" (ASP) is a method of valuation provided for by
19 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(4), (g) (1970). It now applies to four types of products: certain
benezoid chemicals, rubber-soled footwear, certain types of canned clams and wool-
knit gloves. The basis of valuation of these products, when imported into the United
States, is the wholesale price in the U.S. market of the U.S. domestic product that is
like, similar to, or competitive with the foreign import. It is a type of customs valuation
believed to be unique, and it has been bitterly attacked by our foreign trading partners
over a long period of years. For a major review of the products subject to duty under
the ASP formula, see Report of the United States Tariff Commission to the Special
Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations July, 1966 TC Pub. 181 (1966). Two quite
unusual aspects of the system are as follows:
(a) The ASP method of valuation does not apply to all imported products in-
cluded under the general headings mentioned above simply because not all such prod-
ucts are similar to or competitive with products produced in the United States. How-
ever, a U.S. producer who suddenly goes into production of one of these previously
unproduced products automatically "triggers" the application of the ASP method of
valuation.
(b) The second highly unusual feature of ASP is that a U.S. manufacturer who
increases the domestic price of his product in the United States may thereby increase
the value for U.S. customs purposes of the imported products that is similar to or
competitive with his own product, if the U.S. Customs official elects to select the
product produced by the particular domestic manufacturer as the comparable product.
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(b) establishment of quantities on which custom assessments
are made; and
(c) requirements of marking of countries of origin.
The Administration Proposal also recommended a procedure (the so-
called "veto procedure") under which a trade agreement dealing with
other NTM's would go into force unless either house of Congress
"vetoed" the trade agreement in question within 90 days after the
President had submitted a copy of the Trade Agreement. " The veto
of the bill by either house would have required the vote of a majority
of the authorized membership of the House in question.
The veto provision contained in the Administration Proposal was
basically acceptable to the House Ways and Means Committee. The
Senate Finance Committee, however, insisted that in areas as major
and diverse as the NTM's, the agreements should be negotiated "ad
referendum," with implementing bills enacted into law by action of
both Houses.
3 2
Sections 102(c), (d) and (e) of the Trade Act show the very close
cooperation which Congress is insisting must exist between Congress
and the President in this area. First, in Section 102(c), the President
is required, before he enters into any trade agreement dealing with
non-tariff barriers, to consult with various committees of Congress.
Secondly, Section 102(d) provides that whenever the President enters
into such a trade agreement, he is required to submit the agreement,
together with a draft of an implementing bill to the House and the
Senate, and that the agreement shall come into force only if the
provisions of Section 102(e) are complied with and the implementing
bill submitted by the President is enacted into law. Finally, Section
102(e) provides that each such trade agreement shall enter into force
with respect to the United States if and only if:
(a) the President, not less than 90 days before he enters into
the agreement, notifies the House and Senate of his intention
to enter into such an agreement, and promptly thereafter pub-
lishes notice of such intention in the Federal Register, and
31 Congress has delegated authority sudject to such a veto on a number of occa-
sions in the past. Probably the best known example of this type of delegation is
reorganization plans submitted by the President-disapproval by resolution of either
house. 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970). Other such delegations include the following:
(a) Agreements with foreign countries supplementary to the Auto-
mative Products Trade Agreement with Canada, 19 U.S.C. § 2012
(1970); and
(b) Agreements for cooperation with other countries by the Atomic
Energy Commission 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1970).
31 See SFC Report, supra note 4, at 75 et seq.
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(b) after entering into the Agreement, the President trans-
mits to the House and Senate a document containing a copy
of the agreement, together with
(1) a draft of an implementing bill, a statement of
administrative action proposed to implement the agree-
ment and an explanation as to how the implementing
bill and administrative action change or affect existing
law; and
(2) a statement of his reasons as to how the agreement
serves the interest of the U.S. commerce; and
(c) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
Whether or not the proposed trade agreement dealing with NTM
would, in the absence of the Trade Act, require changes in existing
laws, the Trade Act requires that an "implementing bill," as defined
in Section 151(b), be enacted.3
Sections 102(c), (d) and (e) are extremely complicated and may
offer some nice questions of interpretation unless the greatest care is
taken in drafting the implementing bills. Suppose, for example, that
an implementing bill is adopted, but in somewhat different form from
the bill submitted by the President. Section 102(d) provides that the
trade agreement is to go into force only if the implementing bill
submitted by the President is enacted into law. Admittedly, the pro-
visions of Sections 151-154 of the Trade Act are designed to assure
that the bill as submitted by the President will be acted upon without
amendment.
The administration was justifiably concerned that it would be
difficult for it to negotiate and enter into trade agreements if the
representatives of foreign countries had no assurance that the agree-
ments would be acted upon by the U.S. Congress within some reason-
able period of time. To meet this concern, Sections 151-154 were
added to the bill. Section 151 recites that Sections 151-153, inclusive,
are adopted as an exercise of the rule-making power of the House and
Senate and contain the following principal provisions designed to
ensure speedy action:
(a) the implementing bill is to be introduced into the House
and Senate as soon as it is submitted by the President; the bill
is then to be referred to the appropriate committee or commit-
tees;
1 See Trade Act § 102(d); SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 75.
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(b) no amendments to an implementing bill or an approval
resolution will be in order;
(c) the committees are to take action on the bill within 45
days after its introduction; and a vote on final passage is to be
taken in each house within 15 days after it is reported by the
committee (If the implementing bill is a revenue bill, the Sen-
ate is in effect given 30 days to act on the implementing reve-
nue bill when received from the House).
(d) Debate is limited, and a motion to proceed to the consid-
eration of the bill is to be highly privileged;
(e) generally similar provisions apply to concurrent resolut-
tions authorizing order to approve the extension of nondiscri-
minatory treatment to products of third countries (principally
the Communist countries).
As indicated above, the Trade Act makes no effort generally to
define NTM's.3 4 Types of NTM's, however, are discussed, explored
and dealt with in a variety of agreements and treaties. One major
difficulty with GATT is that it makes no comprehensive effort to deal
with these nontariff barriers to trade, probably because of the ex-
treme difficulty in reaching agreement. GATT does deal in one way
or another with the following principal types of nontariff barriers to
international trade:
(a) internal taxes and regulations (Article HI),
(b) anti-dumping duties (Article VI),
(c) countervailing duties (Article VI),
(d) valuation for customs purposes (Article VII),
(e) fees and formalities connected with importation and ex-
portation (Article VIE),
(f) marks of origin (Article IX),
(g) quotas and other quantitative restrictions, either inport
or export (Article XI),
(h) exchange arrangements (Article XI), and
(i) subsidies (Article XVI)
However, the treatment given by GATT seems in some cases to
be outdated and in other cases to be too limited in its scope. Further-
more, GATT does not deal specifically with some of the most impor-
tant of the nontariff barriers; these include buy-national laws31 and
31 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
3 In fact, GATT, art. III para. 8(a) provides that the "national treatment" to be
afforded to imported goods "should not apply to laws governing the procurement by
governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes. . . ." Id.
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policies, industrial standards,3 and agreements37 among principal
exporting countries to maintain a high and uniform price on their
exports of certain goods.
In a major effort to solve some of the problems relating to anti-
dumping duties in 1967, the contracting parties to GATT entered into
an agreement, commonly referred to as the "International Anti-
Dumping Code," as an interpretation of the more summary treat-
ment of anti-dumping contained in Article VI of GATT.
3
1
In 1969, more than twenty years after GATT went into effect, a
group of trade experts from U.S., Europe and Japan listed six classes
of restrictions or barriers as "clearly significant," as follows:
(1) quantitative restrictions on imports;
(2) buy-national laws;
(3) anti-dumping regulations and countervailing duties;
(4) customs valuation methods and procedures;
(5) industrial standards affecting imported products;
(6) government aids to industry giving domestic products an
advantage over imports.
39
In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding as to whether a
trade agreement which changes or removes ASP as a method of val-
uation for U.S. customs purposes requires congressional approval, the
Senate added Section 102(g)(1) which provides that the term "bar-
rier" includes "American selling price." Section 102(g) also provides
that "distortion" includes a subsidy, and that "international trade,"
as used in this Section of the Trade Act, applies to trade in both goods
and services.
Section 102 does not deal explicitly with the question of whether
an agreement between major supplying countries which fix prices for
their products is a nontariff barrier. Clearly, however, it seems that
The wording of articles I and III of GATT is extremely broad and may de
considered to include "industrial standards," but the question is certainly open to
argument. See GATT, arts. I, III.
3' Despite extensive discussions of provisions aimed at restrictive business prac-
tices of private parties, no provisions were included in GATT on his subject.
11 GATT Appendix C, Agreement No. 103, also set out as Appendix to Chapter
16 of JACKSON, supra note 2.
3' S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRIERS Vii (1974). This text discusses the
existence within the United States of legislation or procedures which constitute non-
tariff barriers to trade and which may be classified under these six headings. It also
discusses the legal and political feasibility of removing them or reducing their adverse
effect on trade, but intentionally omits discussion of nontariff barriers to trade in
agricultural products.
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such an agreement would constitute an NTM. The question will
surely be raised in the GATT negotiations-not only in regard to oil,
but also, presumably, with respect to a host of other major products.
The phrase included in Section 102(a) "preventing fair and equitable
access to supplies" is no doubt intended to at least cover agreements
which impose embargos or quantitative restrictions on supply. Other
sections of the Trade Act,4" dealing with access to supplies, refer to
access to supplies at reasonable prices.
One further question arises: What is the relationship, if any, be-
tween the authority granted to the President in respect to tariff bar-
riers (Section 101), and the authority granted to the President in
respect to non-tariff barriers (Section 102)? The tariff authority
granted to the President under Section 101, by its terms, requires no
further approval by Congress. The nontariff authority granted by
Section 102 requires advance notice and consultations with the Con-
gress before the agreement is executed, and express approval of the
agreement by both Houses of Congress after it is executed.
It appears that the President would be acting within his authority
if he entered into a trade agreement dealing only with tariff barriers
before any agreement with respect to the non-tariff barriers was nego-
tiated. It seems highly unlikely, however, that this is a negotiating
gambit which would appeal to the Administration. Furthermore, any
such approach would probably arouse the antagonism of the Congress
and make it even more difficult to obtain congressional approval of
proposed agreements dealing with non-tariff barriers.
Section 103. Overall Negotiating Objective
The overall United States negotiating objective is stated to be:
(a) to obtain more open and equitable access to markets and
to harmonize, reduce or eliminate devices which distort trade
or commerce, and
(b) to the maximum extent feasible, negotiations relating to
agricultural trade barriers shall be undertaken in conjuncion
with industrial barriers.
Congress was dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations dur-
ing the Kennedy round insofar as agriculture was concerned, and
views Section 103 as meaning that in the current negotiations, appro-
11 See, e.g., § 108.
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priate concessions are to be obtained for exports of U.S. agricultural
products,4 ' as well as for exports of industrial products.
Section 104. Sector Negotiating Objective
A principal United States negotiating objective as set out in Sec-
tion 104 is declared to be the obtaining, with respect to product
sectors of manufacturing and the agricultural sector, competitive
opportunities for United States exports to developed countries of the
world equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded in United
States markets to the import of like or similar products. To achieve
this objective, negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of prod-
uct sectors of manufacturing. The STR is to identify appropriate
product sectors of manufacturing.2 The negotiations in the Kennedy
round were principally on a linear basis, i.e. customs duties for almost
all products were decreased by a uniform percentage.
Section 105. Bilateral Trade Agreements
Another United States negotiating objective is to enter into bilat-
eral trade agreements, each of which is to provide for mutually ad-
vantageous economic benefits, if the President determines "that bi-
lateral trade agreements will more effectively promote the economic
growth of, and full employment in, the United States." The approach
to be compared to the bilateral trade agreement is, of course, the
multilateral agreement with many countries with most-favored-
nation clause. This type of agreement extends any concession made
to one country to each country executing the multilateral trade agree-
ment, whether or not that country has made any meaningful conces-
sions of its own. The multilateral agreement with most-favored-
nation clause is the cornerstone of GATT and of the Administration
Proposal" as well as of the 1962 Act and previous trade acts. Despite
the fact that Section 126(a) reaffirms, as a general principle, the
most-favored-nation treatment approach, the title of Section 126,
"Reciprocal Nondiscriminatory Treatment" and Section 126(b) and
(c) as well as Section 105, indicate that the United States is not
irrevocably wedded to the most-favored-nation multilateral agree-
ment approach. The inclusion of this bilateral agreement as a negoti-
ating objective stresses the belief of Congress that for each concession
of the United States, there should be a reciprocal reduction of a trade
" SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 78-79.
The SFC Report indicates that the Committee considers steel, aluminum, elec-
tronics, chemicals, and electrical machinery to be product sectors. Id. at 79.
11 See § 407 of Administration Proposal.
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barrier,44 and it gives the necessary authority to the President to
pursue this approach through bilateral agreements if he deems it
necessary.
In view of the obligation of the United States under Article I of
GATT to make available to all contracting parties any concession
with respect to customs duties granted by the United States to any
other country, a question may be raised as to whether the authority
to enter into bilateral trade agreements is a useful authority. The
answer is two-fold. First, Article I of GATT applies by its explicit
terms only to tariff and import tax concessions and related matters.
Secondly, Section 105 could be considered a not-too-veiled warning
that the United States might withdraw from GATT and proceed on
a bilateral approach.
Section 106. Agreements with Developing Countries
Section 106 recites that a United States objective is to enter into
trade agreements which promote the economic growth of both devel-
oping countries and the United States. This Section is not to be
confused with Title V of the Trade Act ("Generalized System of Pref-
erences") which gives authority to the President, subject to a number
of conditions, to extend preferences, unilaterally, to certain imports
from developing countries. 5
Section 107. International Safeguard Procedures
As previously indicated, a principal United States negotiating
objective, as far as NTM's are concerned, is to work out internation-
ally agreed rules and procedures permitting the use of temporary
measures to ease adjustments to changes in domestic competitive
conditions. Thus, Section 107 outlines the types of provisions which
might be included in any such trade agreement dealing with NTM's.
Section 108. Access to Supplies
Another principal United States negotiating objective is to enter
into trade agreements which assure the United States of fair and
equitable access at reasonable prices to supplies of articles of com-
merce which are important to the economic requirements of the
United States. No such provision was contained in either the Admin-
istration proposal or in the 1962 Act. Of course, the actions of the
OPEC countries in October and December of 1973 and the ensuing
crisis postdate both of those earlier documents.
" See SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 80 (discussions of bilateral trade agreement).
" The SFC Report indicates that these agreements might include mutual access
to supplies and technical agreements. Id.
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Section 108 is an "objective" paragraph. It does not deal with
possible remedial measures and thus makes no reference to cartel
activity. The comments contained in the SFC Report on this Section,
however, are clearly oriented to such activities." Unfortunately, it is
not clear from these comments whether Congress had in mind a gen-
eral understanding "in principle" by the supplying countries which
would not include any provision as to specific prices and/or quanti-
ties, or whether Congress was considering a full-fledged purchase and
sale agreement, under which the United States would be obligated to
purchase specific quantities of the commodities in question over spe-
cific periods at specific prices. On the whole, the language of the SFC
Report47 seems to indicate that the intent is to enter into formal,
specific agreements, probably over a fairly long term.
Chapter 2. Other Authority
This Chapter of the Trade Act provides additional authority and
directives to the President, in some aspects conforming to provisions
contained in the Administration Proposal, but in other aspects add-
ing authority or making explicit authority only given implicitly under
the Administration Proposal.
The principal new subjects covered in this Chapter, as compared
to the 1962 Act include:
(a) the revision of GATT (Section 121);
(b) authority to impose import surcharges and quotas when
United States balance of payments problems require special
measures (Section 122);
(c) authority for the President, subject to certain restrictions,
to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries in order
to compensate48 them for any increases in duty or imposition
of quotas or other protecting devices employed by the Presi-
dent pursuant to the Trade Act which provide import relief for
domestic industries injured by increased imports (Section
123); and
"1 Id. at 81-82.
" Id. at 84-85.
3 At first glance the authority to enter into trade agreements providing
"compensation" for import relief action taken by the United States pursuant to § 203
might seem inconsistent with the objective set out in § 107. In fact, however, §
107(b)(A) envisages that although the general objective is to provide a safeguard sys-
tem which could be employed in specific instances without compensation, in other
cases compensation would be required. Trade Act, supra note 1, §§ 203, 107.
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(d) a requirement that as to any major industrial country
who fails to make concessions in trade agreements entered into
under the Trade Act which provide the United States with
competitive opportunities in such country that are substan-
tially equivalent to those extended by the United States to
such country, the President shall recommend to the Congress
legislation terminating concessions made with respect to rates
of duty (Section 126) and that any legislation necessary to
carry out trade agreements relating to non-tariff barriers not
apply to such country. (Section 126).
None of these four sections were dealt with in the 1962 Act, and only
two of these four, the balance of payments provision-Section 122
and the compensations provision-Section 123, were included in the
Administration Proposal.
Section 121. Revision of GATT
A. Brief Description of GATT
It should be noted at the outset that GATT is an administrative
agreement,49 that it has never been approved by Congress, and that
it became effective as of January 1, 1948.
," GATT is a multilateral agreement between the various participating countries,
referred to as "the Contracting Parties." The cornerstone provision of GATT is con-
tained in article I which, with certain exceptions, assures most favored nation treat-
ment to all contracting parties in regard to customs duties and other charges imposed
in connection with the importation or exportation of goods, and various related matters
as enumerated therein. Any amendment to this article requires the approval of all
contracting parties. GATT contains almost no provisions of an institutional nature
relating to the administration of this complicated agreement. The reason for this
important omission is that at the time GATT was being drafted, it was assumed that
the International Trade Organization (ITO) would be organized, and that ITO would
be the institution charged with the administration of GATT. For an excellent discus-
sion of the initial drafting of GATT and its relation to the proposed ITO, see JACKSON,
supra note 2, at 35-57. ITO was to have somewhat the same responsibilities in the field
of international trade as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) does in the interna-
tional monetary areas. ITO was never formed, in large part because the United States,
its original proponent, finally rejected the concept.
As originally drawn up, GATT had twenty-three contracting parties (Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the
United States, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, the Republic of China, Cuba, Czechoslo-
vakia, India, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria
and the Union of South Africa). This number bad grown to 83 countries as of November
1, 1974, plus 2 countries (the Philippines and Tunisia) who have acceded provisionally
to GATT. There are 17 other countries, now independent, to whose territories GATT
was applied before their independence. Pending final decision as to their future com-
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B. Types of revisions to be made in GATT.
The Trade Act directs the President to obtain amendments to
trade agreements already entered into which would bring them into
conformity with the "development of an open, nondiscriminatory and
fair world economic system," and the Act then lists the following
specific respects in which GATT itself is to be amended:
(1) Decision-making procedures in GATT (Section 121(a)(1)).
Under the Trade Act, decision-making procedures are to be amended
to more nearly reflect the balance of economic interests. The phrase
"decision-making procedures" is a broad one. Presumably it could
cover voting rights, the procedure for amendment of GATT, the votes
required in connection with other matters, and the calling and hold-
ing of meetings of contracting members of GATT. GATT now pro-
vides that each contracting party shall have one vote at all meetings
of the Contracting Parties." The HWMC Report 5' makes clear that
mercial policy, these countries maintain a de facto application of GATT. GATT Press
Release No. GATT 1154 (Nov. 1, 1974).
While it is desirable in principle that a large nunber of countries become members
of GATT, the group has now become so large that it is cumbersome in practice. In order
to provide a much smaller and more practicable group, a "Consultative Group of
Eighteen" was formed. GATT Press Release No. 1163 (July 11, 1975).
The U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China are not members of GATIT.
However, a number of Communist States are parties, including, Burma, Cuba, Czech-
oslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia.
Ninety countries are participating in the "Tokyo round" of negotiations under
GATT including twenty-one countries that are not members of GATT. These 21 coun-
tries include 5 members of OPEC (Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela) and
several additional Communist countries.
Of the twelve full members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, only Indonesia, Kuwait and Nigeria are also contracting parties to GAT. Three
additional full members of OPEC (Algeria, Qatar, and the United Arab Republic) are
included in the 17 now-independent countries mentioned above to whose territories
GAT' was applied before their independence, and which maintain a de facto applica-
tion of GATT. The remaining full members of OPEC (Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) are not parties to GATT.
Not all of the OPEC members participated in the oil embargo of 1973-74. Vene-
zuela, Ecuador, Indonesia and Nigeria continued to export oil during the period of the
embargo. The Arab countries participating in the oil embargo were Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Abu Dahbi, Qatar, Bahrein, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Syria. See New York
Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 6; at 20, cols. 3-8. The embargo has been called "the
Arab oil weapon" against Isreal. J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN, The Arabs Oil Weapon-A
Threat to International Pleace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974).
For a discussion of OPEC and the Arab oil embargo written by one of their
representatives, see J. AMUZEGAR, OPEC in the Context of the Global Power Equation,
4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & Policy 221 (1974).
50 GATI, art. XXV, para. 3.
51 HWMC REPORT, supra note 20, at 26. The report points out that when GA'ir'T
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this provision is one of those to be amended, perhaps by adding a
weighted voting system52 or by providing for mediation panels.
Article XXX of GATT requires unanimous consent in order to
change or amend any provisions of (a) Part I of GATT, and (b) Article
XXX itself. Part I of GATT contains the clause setting out the re-
quirement for "most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) and the
Schedules of Concessions." Other amendments become effective
upon vote of two-thirds of the members, but only in respect of those
contracting parties which accept them. For example an amendment
to the voting rights provision could go into effect if agreed to by two-
thirds of the contracting parties, but any such amendment would not
bind non-assenting contracting parties. 3
The general rule under GATT is that decisions of the Contracting
Parties shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast. 54 There are,
however, numerous exceptions to this general rule. First, any waiver
of obligations under GATT requires a two-thirds majority of the votes
cast, and the approval of more than one-half of the contracting par-
ties.15 Also, the accession of new members requires a two-thirds ma-
jority." Finally, customs union or free-trade proposals which do not
meet precisely the requirements of Article XXXIV, paragraphs 5 to
9 also require two-thirds majority."
Safeguard Provisions in GATT (Section 121(a)(2)). Article XIX
of GATT is to be revised so that it constitutes a truly international
safeguard procedure, taking into account all forms of import restraint
actually used in response to actual or threatened injurious
competition (This Section is repetitive of Section 107).
The existing Article XIX of GATT provides, in effect, that if a
contracting party finds that its domestic industry is being seriously
harmed by an increase in imports resulting from a concession which
was originally drawn up, most of the contracting parties (23 in number) had compara-
ble economic interests and that the number of contracting parties had increased
greatly. The SFC Report adds that the countries with the greatest economic interests
have become a distinct minority. SFC Report, supra note 4, at 83.
52 Under the voting system used by the International Monetary Fund, for instance,
each member has a vote which is proportionate to its quota in the Fund.
11 A number of amendments to GATT have been accepted by two-thirds of the
members-but not by all-with the result that some provisions of GATT are binding
on all parties and some are not.
s GATT, art. XXV, para, 4. As a matter of practice, actions other than "deci-
sions" are generally taken only after a majority vote, except of course where there is a
specific provision. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 122.
5 GATT, art. XXV, para. 5.
5' GATT, art. XXXIII.
', GATT, art. XXlV, para. 10.
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it has given, that party may withdraw the concession or limit it.
Certainly this seems a logical and appropriate remedy-remove the
concession that causes the injury. Section 121(a)(2) of theTrade Act
and others, 8 however, are not limited to injury resulting from a con-
cession. The causal relationship found in Article XIX of GATT has
been deliberately omitted in these Sections of the Trade Act. Section
203 of the Trade Act provides that if the President determines to
provide import relief, he shall take one or more of the actions listed
in such Section. Thus, to permit the President to apply all measures
listed in Section 203 without being in conflict with GATT, the
amendment to GATT should cover all of the following: (a) increase
in duty; (b) tariff-rate quota;59 (c) quantitative restrictions; and (d)
orderly marketing arrangements. Furthermore, Section 107(b)(A)
makes it clear that the amendment to GATT should permit the trade
agreement to provide this relief, under some conditions, without hav-
ing to compensate their trading partners or fear retaliation.
(3) Extension of GATT to "conditions of trade" not presently
covered by GATT (Section 121(a)(3)). The best description of these
additional "conditions of trade" is found in the HWMC Report; they
include: agricultural practices"0 such as export subsidies, production
subsidies, and variable protection at the borders; rules as to govern-
ment procurement;' and rules establishing product standards and
marketing requirements.12 Some reference to private monopolistic or
" See Trade Act, supra note 1, §§ 201-203.
" A "tariff-rate quota" is a provision under which a certain quantity of a particu-
lar product may enter at a certain tariff rate, and all importations of that product in
excess of the established quantity pay duty at a higher rate.
" GATT, art. XI, para. 2(c), which permits restrictions on import of agricultural
products, was originally promoted and defended by the United States in an effort to
protect its then existing elaborate price support program for agricultural commodities.
Perhaps the primary concern of Congress at the present time in the agricultural field
is the European Economic Community (EEC) variable levy which is calculated to
make up the difference between the free-to-frontier price of imported products and the
"threshold price" for the Community. The "threshold price" is set at a level that will
bring the selling price of imported products up to the level of the "target price." The
"target price," in turn, is the basic price for a product determined for the marketing
center of the region having the least adequate domestic supply in the Community. 1
CCH COM. MKT. REP. 426.07, 426.11.
" Similarly, the Federal Buy-American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10a et seq. (1970), and
those of a number of the separate states are, of course, vehemently challenged by our
trading partners in GAT'T.
6, HWMC REPORT, at 26. These include, for example, standards masquerading as
health standards which are in fact protective devices, some consumer protection stan-
dards, and various labelling requirements.
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cartel practices might well have been included here.6 3
(4) Adoption of international fair labor standards and of public
petition and confrontation procedures (Section 121(a)(4)). The fol-
lowing quotation from the House Ways and Means Committee shows
generally what this section of the Trade Act is intended to accom-
plish:
It (The Committee) believes that additional steps are needed
which would lead to the elimination of unfair labor conditions
substantially disrupting or distorting international trade. The
GATT should seek to develop principles with respect to earn-
ings, hours and conditions of employment of workers, and to
adopt public petition and confrontation procedures. The com-
mittee recognizes that the GATT is an organization of sover-
eign states and that it would represent a radical change if
private persons were to be permitted to appear before it or its
instrumentalities to present grievances. It does believe, how-
ever, that, in this important area, an opportunity for affected
individuals and groups, or at the very least, governments act-
ing in their behalf, to make representations concerning labor
conditions would be appropriate."
Although the wording of the clause in the Trade Act is not clear, it is
believed that the phrase "public petitions and confrontation proce-
dures" is intended to apply only to fair labor standards. This clause
may result, in part at least, from testimony given before the SFC by
the Honorable Claude Pepper, a member of the House of Representa-
tives from Florida, which reads in part as follows:
I believe today that we should develop international fair labor
standards which would enable developing countries to develop
their own industry on the basis of rapidly expanding domestic
markets. This would relieve the pressures to tap the high U.S.
market based on the high earnings of American workers. It
would help to restrain the flood of foreign imports that is
threatening to destroy part of our great American market by
destroying the jobs of millions of American wage-earners."
Mr. Pepper was formerly a member of the Senate Labor Committee
63 For a discussion of private monopolies and restrictive business practices and
their relation to GA'IT, see JACKSON, supra note 2, at 522 et seq.
' HMWC REPORT, supra note 21, at 27.
Hearings on H.R. 6367 Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4956 (1973).
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that developed the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act in the late
1930's.
Although Article 7 of the proposed ITO Charter"6 dealt with fair
labor standards, GATT itself does not. It would constitute a substan-
tial expansion in the functions of GATT if it were to venture into this
field. Other international organizations have acquired a very consid-
erable amount of expertise in this area,67 but the development of
international fair labor standards for the very large and diverse
membership of GATT would certainly be a most demanding task.
The intent of Congress as to the nature of any clauses dealing with
international fair labor standards is far from clear. It is possible, for
example, that the Senate Finance Committee included this provi-
sion, even though it recognized that the STR would find it most
difficult to effect any meaningful amendment to GATT in relation to
fair labor standards, because it considered that the representatives
of the Administration should constantly endeavor, in one way or an-
other, to protect "the huge American market based on the high earn-
ings of American workers" to quote from the Honorable Claude Pep-
per's testimony. Indeed, it is remotely possible that the Treasury
Department might seize on this Section of the Trade Act if it were
looking for some legislative peg on which to hang an argument that
for countervailing duty purposes, extremely low labor costs in a given
foreign country constituted a bounty or grant from the foreign govern-
ment involved."
(5) Revision of GATT with respect to the treatment of border
adjustments for internal taxes (Section 121(a)(5)). This is a highly
complicated subject, and it seems probable that the United States
will be fighting a lonely battle; at the very least, it will face very stiff
opposition from the EEC and its member countries. The problem of
border tax adjustments is a two-fold problem, involving, on the one
hand, taxes on imports, and, on the other hand, refund of, or exemp-
tion from, domestic taxes on products that are exported.
" See note 98 infra. The INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION CHARTER (proposed)
art. 7 reads in part, "The Members recognize that unfair labor conditions, particularly
in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly,
each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate
such conditions within its territory."
61 E.g., The International Labour Organization. The Commission of the EEC also
has somewhat the same task for its members.
13 Conversely, if the United States Congress wished to adopt new legislation creat-
ing an incentive for United States industry to increase the export sales of its products,
it might provide a production subsidy, citing the lower wages overseas as a valid
justification for this subsidy.
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(a) Tax on Imports
Let us suppose that country X places an internal turnover tax (in
effect a gross receipts tax) of 10% on the sale of domestically produced
widgets. If country X imports widgets from a third country, the inter-
pretation generally given to the several articles of GATT"' bearing on
this matter is that Country X is permitted to collect customs duties
and also to impose a turnover tax on the imported widget, just as it
imposes this turnover tax on domestically produced widgets. How-
ever, under the terms of GATT, country X can impose this tax on the
imported widgets only if the tax in question is imposed on the product
itself, and not, let us say, on net income arising from its sale. On the
other hand, the provisions of GATT dealing with the matter are not
entirely clear; furthermore, at the present time, the turnover taxes
have assumed a far greater importance than was the case at the time
that GATT was negotiated. At that time customs duties were high
and, generally speaking, the turnover taxes constituted less of a bar-
rier to international trade. The United States follows precisely the
same practice as to imported goods that are of a type which would
be subject to an excise or sales tax if manufactured here.
(b) Treatment of Exports
Country X, as noted above, imposes a turnover tax of 10% on
domestically produced widgets, but it exempts from, or grants a re-
bate of, this tax on all domestically produced widgets that are ex-
ported. Under the terms of GATT, the country to which the produc-
tion in question is exported is not permitted to impose a countervail-
ing or anti-dumping duty on the widget as a result of the above-
described rebate or refund, because the tax remitted is "borne by the
. . . product."
°
Despite the broad language of the U.S. countervailing duty stat-
ute," our courts have held for many years that the statute does not
apply to exemptions from, or rebate of, taxes, if the tax in question
is a tax imposed directly upon the product." The reasoning generally
given for not countervailing against the rebate of such a tax is that a
manufacturer or vendor who sells products domestically that are sub-
ject to this tax on the product "passes on" the tax to the domestic
" GATTP, art. I, para. 2(a); art. III, para. 2; Havana Reports, U.N. Doc. ICITO
118, 63, at 44 (1948).
,1 GATT, art. VI, para. 4.
" Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
" American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050,1057-58 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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purchaser. Thus, when the goods are exported, and the tax is rebated
or not collected, the theory is that the manufacturer simply quotes a
price to his foreign purchaser which does not include the tax, and the
manufacturer therefore makes the same profit on both his domestic
sale and on his export sale.
The law in the United States seems to be precisely the same as
the interpretation given to the exising provisions of GATT. Why then
does Congress instruct the President to seek to modify the provisions
of GATT on this point? The reason is, of course, that many of our
trading partners (particularly those in Europe) rely to a very large
extent upon turnover taxes, whereas the sales and excise taxes on
products collected by the United States Federal Government repre-
sent only about 5.3% of the total budget receipts for 1974; and over
one-half of this amount represented alcohol and tobacco taxes.3 Fur-
thermore, the turnover taxes imposed by many of our trading part-
ners are substantial in amount. The following table74 shows the rate
of value-added taxes imposed as of the end of 1974 in France, Bel-
gium, and Germany:
Reduced Intermediary Increased Normal
Rate Rate Rate Rate
France 7% 17.6% 33-1/3% 20%
Germany 5.5% None 11%
Belgium 6% and 14% 25% 18%
The average of the "normal" rates of VAT in these three countries is
therefore about 16%, whereas we may assume that the average nor-
mal rate of sales or excise tax in the U.S. is about 4%. This is com-
prised principally of the use or sales taxes levied by the various states
since there is no federal sales or turnover tax and there are federal
excise taxes on only a limited group of articles.
In order to dramatize the situation, let us assume the following
set of facts:
(1) A French manufacturer of widgets which are subject to the
increased rate of VAT (33 1-3%) sells his widgets in the French mar-
ket at a price of $1.00 to which is added the VAT, making the amount
paid by the retail customer $1.33;
7 See, the BuDor OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976 332-34.
7 Information as to rates taken from Value-Added Taxation in Europe: 4 GumEs
TO EUROPEAN TAXATION, published by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion [hereinafter cited as Value Added Taxation in Europe].
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(b) A U.S. manufacturer sells widgets of the same design in the
U.S. domestic market at $1.20, plus the average sales tax of 4%,
making the amount paid by the customer about $1.25;
(c) The import duty is 10%, ad valorem, both in the United
States and France, and shipping and insurance charges between the
United States and France are $.05 per widget, in each direction;
(d) The total costs of the U.S. manufacturer are about $1.10 per
widget and the costs of the French manufacturer are $.90 per widget,
60% of the costs of each manufacturer being variable costs and the
balance of such costs being fixed costs;
(e) Each manufacturer is selling about 75% of its capacity;
(f) Neither manufacturer is engaged in the export market;
(g) The U.S. manufacturer is considering an export program to
France, and the French manufacturer is considering an export pro-
gram to the U.S.
(h) Neither the French nor U.S. Governments impose sales, ex-
cise or VAT taxes on export sales.
What will be the position of each manufacturer?
(a) The Position of a U.S. Manufacturer in Regard to Export to
France.
Let us assume that the U.S. manufacturer decides to offer his
products in France at a price of $.95 per widget after freight and
insurance and French customs duties but before French taxes. The
U.S. manuafacturer is then faced with the following additional costs
and taxes on an export sale:
Border tax adjustment .313
Customs Duty .08275
Freight and Insurance .05
Total export costs .445
Aggregate amount paid by
French customer 1.263
Less: total export cost .445
Net revenue received by U.S.
manufacturer .818
Since the variable costs of the U.S. manufacturer are only 60% of
his total costs of $1.10 or $.66 per widget, the export sale by the U.S.
manuafacurer at $.818 would appear to leave him with an economic
11 To simplify computations we have assumed that the French customs duties are
assessed on the price at the foreign factory.
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profit of $.158 per widget. The French customer would pay, in total,
about $.07 less for a U.S. produced widget than for a French-
produced widget. However, since the U.S. manufacturer would be
making his export sales at about $.38 per widget less than the price
at which he would be selling his product in the U.S. market, he would
be dumping, and under the EEC regulation, anti-dumping duties
may be assessed against the widgets so imported up to the extent of
the difference ($.38) if material injury to industry is established2 If
anti-dumping duties were assessed in the full amount, the economic
profit would be completely wiped out.
(b) The Position of the French Manufacturer in Regard to Export
to the United States.
Let us assume that the French manufacturer determines to offer
his widgets for sale in the United States at a price (after freight and
insurance and U.S. customs duties but before U.S. tax) that is $.05
below the price of the U.S. manufacturer, or $1.15.
The French manufacturer is faced with the following costs and
taxes per unit on an export sale:
U.S. tax .046
U.S. customs duty .10
Freight and Insurance .05
Total export cost .196
Aggregate amount paid by U.S. customer 1.196
Less: Total export costs .196
Net Revenue received by
French manufacturer $1.000
Since net revenue received by the French manufacturer on the
export sale is exactly the same ($1.00) as the price charged by him
on a domestic sale, the export sale would leave the French manufac-
turer with precisely the same profit as on his domestic sales, i.e., an
accounted profit of $.10 and an economic profit of $.46. Furthermore
no anti-dumping duties would be assessed by the United States Gov-
ernment, because the price FOB factory in France would be the same
for both the domestic sales and the sales to the United States. Fi-
nally, despite the fact that the aggregate amount paid by the U.S.
purchaser is substantially less than the amount paid by the French
purchaser (solely because of the rebate of the French VAT), under the
,8 EEC COUNCIL REG. 459/68 (April 5, 1968), arts. 2, 19; 1 CCH COM. MKT. REP.
3883 (1968).
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current interpretation of the U.S. countervailing duty statute, no
countervailing duties would be assessed against the imports. One can
readily see, therefore, that the practical result of the GATT rules, no
matter how beautifully supported by academic theory, is not accepta-
ble to the U.S. Congress or U.S. industry or labor.
17
There are of course a variety of courses of action which might be
taken to make the situation in regard to border-tax adjustments and
countervailing duties more palatable to the United States. The
United States could enact a federal value added tax. Since this tax
would raise very substantial additonal revenues, 78 it presumably
would be accompanied by a lowering of other taxes, perhaps a sub-
stantial lowering of the federal corporate income tax.
There surely is no consensus on the effect on prices of the enact-
ment of a value added tax as a replacement for all or a substantial
part of the revenue raised by the corporate income tax. Some authors
believe, however, that if the money supply grows no faster than it
would in the absence of such a change, the imposition of a VAT
cannot generally raise prices for any sustained period. Accordingly,
if the aggregate amount paid by U.S. consumers for the domestic
products they buy (including the amount of the VAT) remains un-
changed, this substitution of the VAT for all or a part of the corporate
income tax, under present laws, including GATT, would probably
mean a growth in U.S. exports or an improvement in the U.S. balance
of trade, and it would also mean that U.S. manufacturers would be
in a better position to meet competition from the overseas manufac-
turers.
71
Another alternative would be for the foreign countries which de-
pend so heavily on the VAT to shift their method of taxation away
from VAT. In view of the great attachment of the EEC authorities
to the VAT, the possibility of this shift occurring seems most remote.
A third alternative would be that the provisions of GATT dealing
71 For a very helpful analytical discussion of the law of GATT as it relates to
border tax adjustments, see JACKSON, supra note 2, at 294-303. See also Value Added
Taxation in Europe, supra note 68; C. MCCLURE & N. TuRE, VALUE ADDED TAX: Two
VIEWS (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCLURE & TUBE].
18 In the article Economics of the Value Added Tax, by Mr. Norman B. Ture,
McCLURE & TURE, supra note 71, at 74, he estimates that the revenue raised by a
federal value added tax would range from a high of $7.6 billion per percentage point
to a low of $6.0 billion per percentage point, depending on the various goods and
economic activities which might be excluded from the tax, e.g. food, medical and other
health services, rent on low-to-medium income housing, educational services. Mr. Ture
points out that in 1971 a 5-6% VAT would have generated the same revenues as the
federal corporation income tax.
"' McCLUmE & TURE, supra note 77, at 86, 92.
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with border tax adjustments would be modified so that countries,
such as the United States, which derive much of their tax revenue
from income taxes instead of excise or VAT taxes would be permitted
to impose income taxes as well as sales or excise taxes." In this
approach, if developed fully, the U.S. companies which export part
of their products would be granted export credits against one or more
direct taxes (perhaps against the corporate income tax). Similarly,
goods imported into the United States would be subjected not only
to any indirect taxes imposed by the federal or state governments on
U.S. produced goods, but also to some portion of the direct taxes
borne by companies producing U.S. produced goods. A major prob-
lem with this approach, both in connection with exports and imports,
is the difficulty of ascertaining what proportion of the corporate in-
come tax paid by a company relates to a particular product., Fur-
thermore, our trading partners are sure to reply that they, as well as
the United States, also impose substantial corporate income taxes,
and that any new formula to be developed must also take this into
account.
A compromise approach, not dealing fully with the problem,
might be to amend GATT so as to provide that if a country, such as
the United States, which depends principally on direct taxes, elects
to exempt exported goods from certain of the U.S. direct taxes, the
importing country would not be permitted to impose countervailing
duties in respect of either the direct or the indirect taxes that are
remitted in respect of the export sales. However, under this compro-
mise, imports to the United States would not have to pay any border
taxes in respect of the U.S. direct tax. This would assist U.S. industry
in its export sales and would eliminate the imposition of countervail-
ing duties by the foreign countries; on the other hand, the imported
80 This is the approach which the Congress might have in mind. See SFC REPORT,
supra note 4, at 84. It would impose a substantial task on the taxing authorities of the
importing countries. For example, the U.S. taxing authorities will already be levying
taxes on income resulting from the resale of the products in question in the United
States. Under this approach, the U.S. tax authorities would be asked also to collect
an income tax (or a tax in lieu of an income tax) on the profits made by the foreign
seller on his sale of the U.S. imports. It would be very difficult for the U.S. authorities
to establish the amount of such profits.
S In the export field, several countries (which exempt the profits made on the sale
of exported goods from their corporate income tax) have approached this problem by
providing that the corporate income tax before tax related to exports shall be deter-
mined by multiplying total corporate income before tax related to the sale of goods by
the following fraction: revenue arising from export sales divided by revenue arising
from total sales. However, this approach does not solve the problem of allocating the
tax among various exported products.
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goods (which have been subjected to corporate income tax at some
rate in their home countries) would not be subjected to yet another
corporate income tax in the United States. Since the suggested com-
promise does not give the countries which rely primarily on income
taxes quite a full loaf (i.e. no border tax adjustments on imported
goods are to be made in respect of income taxes), it would be appro-
priate that such countries would be permitted under the amended
GAT (if they desired) to give the credit for direct taxes on all sales of
exported goods only to companies whose sales of exported goods in
the year in question exceeded the average annual sales of exported
goods during a shifting base period, or some other fair and practicable
approach designed to increase exports. 2 If such a compromise ap-
proach were adopted, it would logically follow that the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code relating to the Domestic International
Sales Corporation ("DISC") would be repealed.
(6) Revision of GATT balance of payments provision. (Section
121(a)(6). Article XII of GATT permits any contracting party "not-
withstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI," in order
to safeguard its balance of payments position, to "restrict the quant-
ity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported" subject to
certain restrictions set forth in the Article. Article XI, paragraph 1,
forbids any prohibition or restriction other than duties, taxes, or other
charges, whether through quotas or import licenses on the importa-
tion of any product. Thus, the cross reference to Article XI seems to
make it reasonably clear that the permission given by Article XII was
directed to quantitative restrictions only. Whether the permission to
impose quantitative restrictions also covers by implication the less
drastic remedy of additional duties or customs surcharges is a matter
of some debate. A change in GATT such as this may be fairly easy
to negotiate. Several of the contracting parties have indeed imposed
temporary customs surcharges in the last few years.
83
82 In drafting the present DISC legislation, it is believed that the Administration
and Congress were concerned that the modest incentive created by that statute would
be regarded as contrary to GATT. Accordingly, the DISC legislation was drafted so
that it applied to all export sales of all companies, rather than providing, for example,
that only companies who increased their export sales would be eligible for this benefit.
The Administration was able to argue that the legislation was not an export subsidy
because the purpose of the legislation was not to increase exports, but only to place
U.S. exporters on a basis of equality with foreign exporters. If the approach suggested
by the text were adopted, the United States might now argue that the new law,
although clearly a measure to increase exports, should be permitted under an amended
GATT because any country taking this approach would still not be on terms of com-
plete equality with VAT countries for the reasons stated in the text.
" These countries include the United States-36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971),
surcharge terminated 36 Fed. Reg. 24201 (1971)-Great Britain and Denmark.
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(7 and 8) Improvement of provisions of GATT and other interna-
tional agreements governing access to supplies of food, raw materials
and manufactureed products, and concerted action against export
cartels (Section 121(a)(7) and (8)). This provision, as well as the
following portions of Section 121(a), were added to the bill by the
Senate Finance Committee. In its report, the Committee recognized
that reaching an agreement of this sort with developing, producing
countries may be difficult. The Committee desires these negotiations
to deal with "monopolistic behavior" by producing countries and also
to provide for sanctions against "nations which significantly injure
the international community by denying fair and equitable access to
suppliers at reasonable prices." The inclusion of this clause, as well
as Section 108 of the Trade Act, emphasizes the importance which
Congress attaches to this matter.
Article XI of GATT, which, with certain important exceptions,
forbids quantitative restrictions, applies by its terms to export re-
strictions, as well as to import restrictions. The restriction on exports
is, however, subject to numerous qualifications:
(a) Article XI(2): temporary restrictions on export of food-
stuffs or other products "essential to the exporting party," and
restrictions necessary for the classification, marking or grading
of commodities in international trade;
(b) Article XX(g): exhaustible mineral resources; and
(c) Article XXI: the security exception.
Taken together, these exceptions greatly weaken the protection in
GATT against export restrictions. Only one complaint has been filed
which is based on an export restriction.
The wording of Section 121(a) (7) is certainly consistent with Arti-
cle XX, paragraph j, of GATT, which provides, subject to certain
exceptions, that nothing in GATT shall prevent the adoption of mea-
sures "essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in gen-
eral or local short supply." This same paragraph continues as follows:
"Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the princi-
ple that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of
the international supply of such products." Thus, the position fa-
vored by the United States is permitted by GATT. Indeed, the clause
set forth above seems to be a backhanded way of declaring that all
contracting parties are entitled to a fair share of the international
supply of the products in question. If the countries are entitled to this
share, then logically, the producing counties that are parties to
GATT must be obligated to supply it. The difficulty, however, in this
line of reasoning is that the phrase "international supply" may be
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read as meaning "the portion of the goods in question which the
producing countries are ready to offer in international trade."
Furthermore, as noted above, Article XX(g) would seem very helpful
to the OPEC countries if they simply wished to ration their exports
of oil to all countries in order to conserve their supplies.
The decision of a single country acting unilaterally, to decrease its
export sales of a strategic commodity, such as oil, probably could be
easily justified under the security exception or under Article XX. An
agreement between a group of countries to fix prices would seem to
be harder to justify under the security exception. Furthermore, a full-
fledged agreement between a number of producing countries to with-
hold sale of their goods and/or to fix the prices to be charged for their
goods seems to be much more aggressive in nature and to be incon-
sistent with their obligations under GATT. Perhaps the situation
here resembles the U.S. antitrust doctrine-a single company refus-
ing to deal, with no ancillary restraints, does not violate the law. A
group of companies agreeing to fix prices or to withhold production
would most assuredly offend.
A major problem, of course, in solving the access to oil problem
through negotiations under GATT is that the major producers of oil
for export are not members of GATT.84 On the other hand, a number
of the important oil exporting countries" (with the prime exception
of Saudhi Arabia) will be participating in the Tokyo round of negotia-
tions. Furthermore, GATT has had some part, though far from a
central one, in connection with a number of the international com-
modity agreements.86 A limited agreement on world grains" was nego-
tiated as part of the Kennedy round negotiations. The impetus for
this agreement came from the developing countries, however, so that
its provisions, which in some respects represent concessions to the
developing countries, may well be totally unacceptable as a model for
an international multilateral oil supply agreement. One solution to
the oil shortage of the developed countries might be the buffer stock."
" See note 49 supra.
81 These countries include Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Tunisia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ni-
geria, and Venezuela. See GAT'T Press Release No. GATT/1154 (Nov. 1, 1974).
" See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 726, 27.4.
U Final Act Authenticating the Results of the 1964-67 Conference, GATT Doc.
L/2813 (1967); and a related "memorandum of Agreement," GATT Doc. L]2814 (1967).
11 The buffer stock approach is of course not a new one as far as the United States
Government is concerned. The U.S. strategic stockpile of various metals and commodi-
ties established at the start of World War II is an important example. 50 U.S.C. § 98
et. seq. (1970). Although intended primarily as a security measure, the United States
government has used, or threatened to use, the stockpiles from time to time in order
to maintain price stability. For a discussion of buffer stocks in economic terms, see H.
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This approach, which is frequently discussed as one of the principal
methods of price stabilizations, has the further major advantage,
from the point of view of the consuming country, that it also assures
availability of supply, at least for a temporary period. Furthermore,
if the buffer stock approach is used by a large proportion of major
consumers, it could well tend to assure substantial supplies over a
considerably longer period, even if we assume no agreement as to
sharing of resources by the consuming countries. This seems probable
because the producing countries, if they were faced with the probabil-
ity of a low level of shipments over a protracted preriod of time, might
well be unwilling to embark upon a program of reduced production
and/or higher prices.
According to newspaper reports, Japan has begun to acquire a
buffer reserve stock in addition to normal storage supplies, sufficient
to meet the country's need for a limited period of time. Here in the
United States, the Administration proposed legislation calling for a
buffer stock of one billion barrels of oil,89 and Congress subsequently
provided for such a stock.9"
(9) Procedures for regular consultations among countries and
procedures to adjudicate commercial dispute (Section 121(a)(9)).
GATT requires that representatives of the contracting parties meet
from time to time9' for the purpose of carrying out provisions of GATT
which require their joint action. These sessions have been held on a
roughly annual basis, the thirtieth session taking place in November,
1974.92 Other GATT meetings include meetings of the Council, of the
various committees, and of working parties. The emphasis to be ap-
plied on the wording of Section 121(a)(9) is on the word "regular."
GERHARD, Commodity Trade Stabilization Trhough International Agreements 28 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 276, 282 (1963) [hereinafter cited as GERHARD]; W. SCHMIDT, The
Case Against Commodity AGreements, 28 L. & COMTEMP. PROB. 513, 514 (1963).
"' The examples of buffer stocks cited above (i.e. the United States and Japan)
are of course examples of unilateral action. However, Gerhard concludes that the
multi-country buffer stock scheme "would have to provide for a central agency acting
as a 'speculator' in the commodity market concerned." GERHARD, supra note 83, at 283.
This type of approach might fit in well with the guaranteed "minimum price" ap-
proach for the OPEC oil producing countries put forward by Secretary of State Kissin-
ger. A jointly owned buffer stock perhaps would be more easily salable, as a political
matter, because its price stabilization actions (which would tend to benefit all consum-
ing countries) could result in substantial losses if the trend of price is downwards. From
a security point of view, the jointly owned and administered buffer stock would present
problems, but the physical buffer stock could be stored or warehoused in the various
consuming countries in proportion to their participation.
,O Pub. L. No. 94-163 (Dec. 22, 1975).
GATT, art. XXV.
" GATT Press Release No. GATT/1113 (Oct. 25, 1974).
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This paragraph also recommends "procedures to adjudicate commer-
cial disputes among countries." GATT contains a number of provi-
sions for resolution of disputes; 3 however, as a number of authors
have pointed out, these provisions are strongly slanted toward concil-
iation by consultation and negotiation. The thrust of the Trade Act,
as indicated by the word "adjudicate," is toward a more formal, more
decisive procedure. It is interesting, and perhaps ironic, to note that
a number of revisions in GATT urged by Section 121(a) would have
been covered by the Charter of ITO if the United States Congress had
not rejected that organization. Consider, for example, Articles 92-97
of ITO9 5 which provide a considerably different procedure for settle-
ment of disputes than that set forth in GATT, including reference of
disputes to the International Court of Justice.
(10) Reciprocity and Nondiscrimination including the elimina-
tion of "special preferences" and "reverse preferences" (Section
121(a) (10)). The terms "special preference" and "reverse preference"
are not defined in GATT or by other generally accepted sources.
However, the meaning of "special preference" seems fairly clear. If,
for instance, A, one of the contracting parties to GATT, extended a
tariff treatment to B, a non-member of GATT, which was more favor-
able than the tariff treatment extended by A to contracting parties
of GATT, "special preference" would be present.
The meaning of reverse preference is not so clear. It does appear,
though, that the EEC adopts a restrictive definition of this phrase,
as follows: Assume that B, in return for the concession described
above, extended tariff treatment to the goods of A which was more
favorable than the tariff treatment extended by B in respect of such
goods to certain other contracting parties of GATT, and B also agreed
with A that B would not extend this preference to such other coun-
tries. EEC considers that a reverse preference is the more favorable
treatment extended by B to A coupled with an agreement on the part
of B not to extend the same preference to others. It appears probable
that the United States, on the other hand, will take the position that
a reverse preference exists when B extends tariff treatment to the
goods of A which is more favorable than the tariff treatment extended
by B in respect of such goods to other contracting parties of GATT,
' GATT, arts. XIX, XXII, XXIII, XXV.
" H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, 1156-57 (2d Ed. 1975).
"The Final Act of the United National Conference on Trade and Employment
was held in Havana and signed by 53 countries March 24, 1948. The signing simply
authenticated the text of the agreement but did not commit the governments to ratify.
C, WILcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 49 (1949). The text of the Charter is reprinted
at 227.
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whether or not B further agrees with A that B will not extend this
preference to such other countries.
The SFC report does not elaborate as to which countries or re-
gional groups that are members of GATT give special preferences and
receive reverse preferences. No doubt many, if not all, of the contract-
ing parties give preferences and receive reverse preferences. GATT
recognized the existence of certain preferences in force at the time it
was originally signed. 5 Furthermore, Article XXIV of GATT pro-
vides, in effect, an automatic regional exception for customs unions
and free trade areas that comply with the provisions of this article.
It seems probable, however, that the Senate Finance Committee had
in mind the tariff, quota, and other arrangements involved in the
arrangements between the EEC and a large group of developing coun-
tries, many of these located in Africa. From the inception of the Rome
Treaty,97 the EEC had contemplated a special relationship between
the EEC and those overseas areas which were then or had been colo-
nies or otherwise specially related.
Thus, the EEC at first extended special preferences to 1811 inde-
pendent states, all located in Africa and formerly linked with France,
Belgium, and Italy, known as the "associates." Mauritius was added
to this group in 1973. Somewhat more limited arrangements were
concluded by the EEC with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Morocco and
Tunisia in 1969. Prior to Great Britain joining the European Com-
munity, the EEC extended preferences to a rather limited number of
countries or territories' 0 outside of Africa. All of these relationships
were scheduled to terminate as of January 31, 1975.
In the negotiations leading up to Great Britain joining the EEC.
one of the major problems that had to be solved was the relationship
of the various members of the British Commonwealth to Great Brit-
ain after it became a member of the EEC. A further vital question,
not settled for some years, was the relationship between the develop-
ing countries of the British Commonwealth and the other members
of the EEC. The recommendations of the Commission of the EEC on
" See GATT, art. I, para. 2 & Annexes A-F.
" See Rome Treaty, art. 131-36.
"1 Much of the information. set out below has been summarized from EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT An): How THE EUROPEAN CONMUNITY IS
HELPING THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1972).
" These states are Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Senegal, Da-
homey, Togo, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Cameroun, Gabon, Congo Braz-
zaville, Congo Kinshasa (now Zaire), Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and Madagascar.
101 These include Comoro Islands, French Afar and Issa Territory, French Polyne-
sis, New Caledonia, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Netherlands Antilles, Guyana, Suri-
nam, Wallis and Fortuna, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Southern and Antarctic Territo-
ries, and Reunion.
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this important subject to the Council of the EEC were summarized
in a press release issued by the EEC on April 30, 1973.101 This memo-
randum also contained the recommendations of the Commission with
regard to the relationship which should exist after January 31, 1975,
between the EEC, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the
developing countries mentioned and the developing countries of the
British Commonwealth. After extensive negotiations, a new conven-
tion, known as the "Lome Convention," was signed in Lome, the
capital of Togo, on February 28, 1975. The agreement covers a total
of 46 developing countries, including 21 members of the British Com-
monwealth in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The Convention
must be ratified by each member of the EEC and by two-thirds of
the developing countries before it goes into effect."' 2
The special preferences and reverse preferences thus established
differ somewhat as between the countries and territories but in regard
to the African countries and territories, the following generally"0 3
summarizes these agreements:
Preferences and Reverse Preferences in effect as of January 31,
1975.
(A) Preferences: The EEC permits products of the African states
listed above to enter the EEC free of duty, except for agricultural
products which are generally permitted to enter at a favorable duty
as regards products from third countries, but not duty-free. In gen-
eral, no quotas are imposed.
(B) Reverse Preferences. EEC products enter the African coun-
tries'0 1 free of customs duties, and of quotas, except as needed to meet
their development requirements. Citizens and conferences of the
EEC have the right of free establishment in the African countries.
Prior to the Lome Convention, the EEC enjoyed reverse preferences
because the African c untries were not permitted to extend to third
0I Reprinted in CCH COMM. MKT. REP. T 9558 (1973).
"0 The forty-six countries are as follows: Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Brazzaville, Dahomey, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Rhana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bussau,
Ruyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad, Uganda, Voltaic Republic,
Western Samoa, Zaire, Zambia. As of January 20, 1976, seven member states of the
European Communities have ratified the Lome Convention and 38 of the 46 ACP
countries have ratified it, CCH COMM. MKT. REp., Environment News, Issue No. 366,
at 3 (January 20, 1976).
'I The listing is correct for the 18 countries mentioned in note 99, supra. Some-
what more restricted preferences are granted to the other five African countries listed
above.
I" Togo, Burundi, and Congo Kinshasa (now Zaire) give the EEC no preferential
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countries the same concessions they extended to the EEC.
Preferences and Reverse Preferences under the Lome Convention.
The summary of the memorandum from the Commission to the
Council contained in the press release referred to above states that:
The memorandum answers a frequent American reservation
concerning Yaounde II when it recommends that acceptance
by the Associates of the mutual free trade area proposal should
"not entail any obligation to grant preferences to the Com-
munity." The Associates would retain complete tariff auton-
omy in their relations with third countries.
The Commission clearly recommends in its 1973 memorandum to the
Council that under the new arrangements, EEC products would be
given entry free of customs duties by the associate countries. The
press release announcing the plans for signature of the Lome Conven-
tion' 5 states that the ACP countries will give the EEC no "reverse
preferences" but will give them most-favored nation treatment and
will not discriminate between EEC member states. Ninety-six per-
cent of farm products from the ACP countries will enter the EEC free
of customs duties, and the remaining four percent will receive EEC
preferential treatment. Presumably all products from the ACP coun-
tries other than farm products will enter the EEC free of customs
duties. At the time that the Lome Convention was signed, the British
Commonwealth tariff preference system was, of course, in existence.
As a result of the Convention, each of the nine member countries of
the EEC will be entitled (as a minimum) to the same preferences as
Great Britain was entitled to. Until a copy of the Lome Convention
is published, one cannot be sure whether the products from the EEC
will enter the associate countries free of customs duties as recom-
mended by the Commission in 1973. If not, it would seem that the
arrangement could hardly qualify as a free trade area or customs
union area under GATT. It seems clear, however, that the EEC will
no longer require the associates to agree that they will not extend to
other countries the preferential terms that they extend to the EEC.
Under the Lome Convention, the EEC will be obligated to in-
crease substantially the financial existence extended to the associate
countries over the five-year term of the agreement. The aggregate aid
to be extended will amount to units of account (U.A.) totalling 3.390
's Background note from the European Community Information Service, No.
6/1975, revised; reprinted in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9715 (1975). In a further
announcement, the EEC agreed to put into effect on July 1, 1975, on a unilateral basis,
the provisions of the Convention relating to trade even though the Convention had not
then been signed by two-thirds of the parties. 2 CCH COMM, MKT. REP. 9757 (1975).
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billion (equivalent at the present time to about U.S. $4.07 billion),
broken down as follows:
Grants U.A. 2.1 billion
Special loans .430 billion
Loans from the European Investment Bank .39 billion
Equity capital .095 billion
Export stabilization fund .375 billion
Total 3.390 billion
Of these forms of aid, the export stablization fund is possibly of
the greatest interest in terms of trade. This fund will be set aside to
aid countries heavily dependent on the export of certain raw materi-
als and agricultural items 5 by protecting against price and
production-level fluctuations. It is summarized as follows:
When receipts drop by a certain percentage, countries can
request compensation. The mechanism triggering the fund will
operate sooner for the poorest countries, which will not have
to reimburse the fund. In principle, certain ACP associates
states must repay these earnings when the price rise."0 7
Furthermore, as part of the Lome Convention, a purchase and sale
agreement in respect of sugar was negotiated. Its terms are also sum-
marized in the above-mentioned press release; it is to continue for a
minimum of seven years.
Until a much more detailed and rigorous analysis is made of the
provisions of the Convention, it is impossible to say with any cer-
tainty whether its provisions are inconsistent with GATT. In the
past, the EEC has justified the preferences it extended to the African
countries on the ground that these countries constituted a "customs
union" with the EEC, an exception to the most-favored-nation re-
quirement of GATT. However, the following general statements show
how the Lome Convention compares with its predecessor agreement:
Favorable Aspects Unfavorable Aspects
(1) The EEC has at least omitted the (1) The number of countries receiving
contractual aspect of the reverse and giving preferences has been greatly
preference. increased.
(2) The existence of the export stabliza-
tion fund, which is administered in large
part by the EEC, might result in trade
being diverted from its normal channels.
The products affected include peanuts, cocoa, coffee, cotton, coconuts, palm
nuts and kernels, hides and skins, timber products, bananas, tea, raw sisal, and iron
ore.
107 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REp. 9715 (1975).
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The ACP countries which will be entitled under the Convention
to preferences in regard to trade with the EEC, can, as a practi-
cal matter, be expected to object either to the removal of those pre-
ferences or to the enlargement of the preference granted by the
EEC so that it extends to all other countries. 08 However, if the broad-
ening of the tariff preference by the EEC to all developing countries
were a part of a scheme under which a general preference, in respect
to manufactured and semi-manufactured products, were extended by
all the industrialized members of GATT to all the developing coun-
tries, the interest of at least some of the African countries would
possibly be advanced. It should be noted that the GATT Declaration,
issued on September 14, 1973, relative to the current round of trade
negotiations stressed the importance of "securing additional benefits
for the international trade of developing countries." Indeed, concern
for the trade of developing countries, and for the particular problems
of the least-developed among the developing countries, is perhaps the
major specific concern set out in the GATT declaration. Thus, the
general concept of making available to all developing countries the
preferences now extended to certain of the developing countries
would seem to be generally in accord with the concern expressed
above. It is not entirely clear as to how the EEC would react to a
broadening of preferences, but in general it is believed that they
would be opposed. The summary of the Commission Report to the
Council seems to make it reasonably clear that the Lome Convention
and its predecessor conventions are regarded by the EEC as a method
of increasing EEC trade with the associates. 9
(11) Revisions of GATT Necessary to Define the Forms of Subsi-
dies to Industries Producing Products for Export and Forms of Subsi-
dies to Attract Foreign Investment Which Will Be Acceptable
Internationally (Section 121(a)(11)).
Although GATT contains no provision generally defining the term
"subsidy," Article XVI, para. 1, of GATT requires a contracting
party to notify GATT if it maintains any subsidy, including any form
of income or price support, which operates . . . "to increase exports
of any product from, or reduce imports of any product into, its terri-
"I The EEC Commission made exactly this point with regard to the African
associates in its 1973 memorandum to the Council.
109 See, e.g., the following statement in the commission's report to the Council:
"Tihe Community will have to take steps to revitalize and improve the commercial
content of the Association, unless it wishes to see a large part of its commercial import-
ance whittled away, with the additional risk that within 15 years the Association will
have ceased to be a framework for an effective overall policy of cooperation in the
development field." 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9558 (1973).
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tory." However, the wording of paragraph 1 (which is the only portion
of Article XVI which deals with subsidies operating to reduce
imports) only obligates the party giving the subsidy to "discuss" with
the party seriously prejudiced "the possibility of limiting the sub-
sidy." Furthermore, Article III 8(b) of GATT, which is concerned
with national treatment being accorded to imported products, specif-
ically permits the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic prod-
ucers. Accordingly, it seems probable that Congress intentionally
limited" ° Section 121(a)(11) of the Trade Act to export subsidies and
to subsidies given to attract foreign investment, omitting any men-
tion of subsidies which operate generally to reduce imports.
The 1960 GATT working party stated that a list of eight practices
were generally agreed to be subsidies, but noted that this list was not
exhaustive."' Article XVI, paragraph 4, of GATT"' proscribes export
subsidies on any products other than primary products; but as to
primary products, Article XVI, paragraph 3 is much weaker. It pro-
vides that contracting parties should "seek to avoid" export subsidies
on primary products, and if such subsidies are granted by any party,
it shall not result in the contracting party "having more than an
equitable share of world trade in that product. .. ."
A general definition of "subsidy" which was developed in 1965 by
the staff of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Con-
gress is set out below."' This general language, although well drafted,
"I The SFC Report speaks broadly of the necessity for developing improved rules
relating to "subsidies." In particular "the concept of an internationally acceptable
export subsidy" should be defined and "comparable" treatment should be given to
primary and non-primary products. The word "comparable" is certainly not clear.
Does it mean that the phrases "primary products" and "non-primary products" should
be defined? Or does it mean that the same rules as to acceptable subsidies should apply
to both primary products and non-primary products? SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at
85. Probably the latter is intended, the SFC being opposed to the differential treatment
accorded by GATT, Article XVI, §B to export subsidies on primary products as com-
pared to non-primary products.
"I GATT 9th Supp. BISD 185, 186-87 (1961); reprinted in JACKSON, supra note 2,
at 385.
"1 Only 17 of the major trading countries in GATT have agreed to this provision.
See STAFF OF SUBCOMMrITEE ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF THE MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
27 (1975).
"I "A subsidy is an act by a governmental unit involving either (1) a payment,
(2) a remission of charges, or (3) supplying commodities or services at less than cost
or market price, with the intent of achieving a particular economic objective, most
usually the supplying to a general market a product or services which would be sup-
plied in as great quantity only at a higher price in the absence of the payment or
remission of charges. Government loans made at lower than market rates of interest
or at rates below the cost of funds to the government and government insurance
provided at lower than private insurance premium rates may also appropriately be
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does not seem to cover some of the specific practices listed by the
GATT working party referred to above. Probably the optimum ap-
proach to the problem from the point of view of amending GATT
would be a general definition, plus a listing, stated to be illustrative
and not all-inclusive, of a number of specific practices agreed to fall
within the definition.1
4
The second portion of paragraph 3 appears to contemplate agree-
ment by the contracting parties to GATT that certain subsidies or
inducements may be given by the contracting parties to attract for-
eign investment and that these subsidies would be declared (a) not
to be contrary to GATT and (b) not to give rise to the imposition of
countervailing duties by importing countries. Any such subsidies
must, however, be "consistent with an open, nondiscriminatory and
fair system of international trade." Depending of course, on the
breadth of the definition of export subsidies, this paragraph, insofar
as it relates to the United States, might well result in a substantial
amendment to the countervailing duty law"5 as it goes much further
than the specific amendments to the law which are set forth in Sec-
tion 331 of the Trade Act.
Certainly, if a government desires to induce industry to build
factories in a given area of its country, or to induce industry to make
investments which will result in increased exports, it usually will not
wish to limit these subsidies to foreign investment only. Any such
legislation could well arouse substantial objections from local sources
of capital. It is, of course, possible that the Trade Act is phrased as
it is because Congress believed that any broad agreement as to per-
missible investment subsidies would be difficult to reach, and that
it might be somewhat easier if the field were narrowed by limiting it
to subsidies or incentives given to attract foreign investment. Devel-
oped countries do give incentives to attract industry to particular
areas that are for one reason or another industrially undeveloped
(Italy, for its southernmost area; Canada, for its maritime provinces).
The developing countries, however, are the countries most prone to
giving incentives to attract industry. For many of the developing
countries, their lack of capital means that any investment will need
to be primarily foreign investment.
Congress may not expect a listing of specific sorts of subsidies that
considered as subsidies." STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDY-
EFFECT PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 89th Cong. 1st Sess, 39 (1965).
"' This approach has been recommended by the United States Government to the
Trade Negotiations Committee working group of GATT. BACKGROUND AND STATUS
OF THE MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 112, at 28.
"Is 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1975 Supp.).
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would be acceptable. It is more probable that Congress might have
had in mind a listing of circumstances which would justify the grant-
ing of subsidies. One example which jumps to mind is, of course, the
subsidies given to attract investment to a portion of a country which
is industrially handicapped in comparison with other areas, either
because of distance from markets, distance from suppliers, inade-
quate labor supply, lack of good transportation facilities, or the like.
If the subsidies do no more than offset these initial disadvantages,
and if the subsidies are to be phased out over some reasonable period,
the subsidies seem to have a certain equity in their favor. It is be-
lieved, for example, that the United States Treasury Department
may have some internal ground rules to the effect that if a foreign
subsidy does no more than offset a clearly demonstrable and
quantifiable disadvantage, countervailing duties would not be as-
sessed.
The imposition of countervailing duties by one government
against imports from another country which subsidizes the produc-
tion or exportation of such products always involves international
political considerations. If agreement could be reached as to the pro-
priety of certain types or forms of subsidies, these political problems
could be reduced.
(12) Revision of GATT in order to establish within GATT "an
international agreements" [sic] on articles (including footwear)
(Section 121(a) (12)). This paragraph was added by the committee on
conference without explanation of exactly what was intended. De-
spite the imprecision of the language, a reasonable interpretation
seems to be that GATT should be further amended so as to provide
for or include an "orderly marketing agreement" which would limit
the importation of footwear"' and perhaps other articles into the
United States. Both the 1962 Act"7 and the Trade Act"' permit the
President to enter into "orderly marketing agreements.""' Problems
which have arisen since the 1962 Act under the textile orderly mar-
keting agreements may have inspired the additional provisions in this
subsection of the Trade Act relative to institutionalized mechanisms
for the settlement of disputes, and for a surveillance body to monitor
M' It is interesting to note that the only article of merchandise mentioned in the
entire Trade Act is "footwear." That article is mentioned twice, in this section and in
§ 331(a) non-rubber footwear."
1" 19 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
" Trade Act § 203(a)(4).
' See, e.g., "Long-term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles" and the Extending Protocol, UNTS 471/296 and GATT Document No. GATT
L/2892.
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shipments of such articles.
Does the recital of the Trade Act of the various ways in which the
United States Government wishes to have GATT changed strengthen
or weaken the position of the STR in the negotiations lying ahead?
The initial position of the Administration was to request a very
broad negotiating authority. In his message to Congress supporting
this request, the President did indeed explain in rather general terms,
some of the negotiating goals of the Administration; but the goals as
expressed were not nearly so detailed nor so extensive as those set
forth in the Trade Act. As previously pointed out, many of the recom-
mended revisions of GATT, as contained in the Trade Act, were not
even mentioned in the President's message or in the Administration
Proposal. Congress, however, insisted on detailing the aspects in
which GATT should be revised and apparently was willing to give the
Administration authority to negotiate only if these precise goals were
set forth in the Trade Act itself. Certain of the proposed revisions of
GATT are set forth in Section 121, but there are a number of other
substantive provisions of the Trade Act which would also require
amendments to GATT, including Section 102 (NTB's), Section 122
(Balance of payments authority), Title II, Sections 202 and 203, and
Title V120 (Generalized System of Preferences).
These various United States objectives as set forth in the Trade
Act are far more detailed and extensive than (a) those set forth in the
Tokyo Declaration' 2' and (b) those advanced to date by the EEC.
1 2
No categorical answer can be given as to whether the position of the
STP is strengthened or weakened by the detailing of these goals in
the Trade Act. However, the following observations can be made with
regard to the matter:
" Perhaps a waiver could be obtained from GATT in respect of Title V, without
any amendment of GATT.
I GATT Document No. GATT/1136 (Oct. 29, 1973).
"2 For the negotiating mandate approved by the Council of the EEC in 1973, see
the background note from the European Community Information Service No. 17/1973,
reprinted in CCH COMM. MKT. REP. T 9588 (1973); it is expected that the EEC will
revise this negotiating mandate now that the U.S. Trade Act has been passed.
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Arguments in Favor of Setting Forth the
Goals
(1) Since many of the U.S. objectives
are not contained in the Tokyo Declarat-
ion, it may be necessary to revise that
declaration in order to permit the
negotiations to cover these points. If so,
the setting forth of these points in a
concrete manner in the Trade Act is a
prerequisite for an orderly handling of
the issues.
(2) The fact that the President is
directed by the Trade Act to accomplish
these amendments to the GATT can be
said to strengthen the position of the
STR in the negotiations. He is in a
position, when challenged on a par-
ticular issue, to say that this is a matter
of policy of the United States Govern-
ment clearly set forth in his negotiating
authority.
Arguments Against Setting Forth the
Goals
(1) In many negotiating situations, a
negotiator often believes that it is not
desirable for him to set forth, at the
outset of the negotiations, each and
every one of the goals or objectives
which he hopes to achieve. He will, by
this disclosure, perhaps prematurely
forewarn the other negotiators enabling
them to advance their goals at the
expense of his goals.
(2) Obviously, since a rather substantial
number of goals are set forth in the
Trade Act as to the revision of GATT,
some of these goals will be much more
important to the interests of the United
States than the others. The natural
effect of detailing all of these objectives
in the Act may well be to cause the STP
to endeavor to negotiate some changes
or improvements with regard to each
goal, whereas if the list of objectives
were not so full and detailed, the STP
would be free to concentrate on those
objectives considered most important to
the interests of the United States.
(14) Provisions of Section 121(b), (c), and (d).
Section 121(b) directs the President, to the extent feasible, to
enter into trade agreements with foreign countries embodying the
various provisions set forth in Section 121(a). Section 121(c) provides
that if the implementation of any such trade agreement will change
any provision of federal law'2 3 (including a material change in an
administrative rule), the agreement shall take effect only if the ap-
propriate implementing legislation is enacted by Congress, unless
Congress has delegated authority to implement the agreement. The
implementing legislation may be submitted to Congress under Sec-
tion 151 of the Trade Act, which is designed to assure speedy legisla-
tive action on the proposed bill. Finally in Section 121(d), Congress
"' This provision (which requires submission to Congress only if the implementa-
tion of the trade agreement will change any provision of federal law or a material
change in a rule) seems to conflict with Trade Act § 102 (which apparently requires
submission of any trade agreement dealing with non-tariff barriers to Congress whether
or not the implementation of the trade agreement will require any change in federal
law). Certainly many of the provisions of Trade Act § 121(a) deal with non-tariff
barriers.
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authorizes the appropriation of funds annually that are necessary to
enable the United States to bear its share of the expenses of GATT
but retains its aloof position in regard to GATT by stating that this
appropriation of funds by Congress does not imply "approval or dis-
approval by the Congress of all articles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade."
Section 122. Balance of Payments Authority
Subsection (a) of Section 122 provides that if fundamental inter-
national payments problems (such as a large and serious U.S. bal-
ance of payments deficit) require special import measures, the Presi-
dent shall either:
(a) impose a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15%
ad valorem,
(b) impose temporary quotas, or
(c) impose both a temporary import surcharge and a tempo-
rary quota.
Quotas are to be imposed only (a) if permitted by international trade
or monetary agreements to which the United States is a party, and
(b) only to the extent the imbalance cannot be dealt with by an
import surcharge. If the President determines that the imposition of
these import restrictions is contrary to the public interest of the
United States, he may refrain from imposing the restrictions but shall
inform Congress of his decision and consult with congressional advis-
ers.
On the other hand, subsection (b) provides that if the President
determines that fundamental international payment problems (such
as a large and persistent U.S. balance of payments surplus) require
special import measures to increase imports, the President is author-
ized:
(a) to temporarily reduce customs duties on any article (but
not more than 5% ad valorem), or (b) to suspend quotas or
to increase the amount of goods importable under quota.
In general, the import restrictions and the import liberalizing ac-
tions are to be applied in a broad and non-discriminatory fashion.
However, under Section 122(d), the President is authorized to impose
import restriction measures against one or more countries having
large or persistent balance of payments surpluses, and to exempt all
other countries from the import restrictions." 4
121 In view of the fact that the United States in 1975 had a large balance of
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The President is urged to seek modification of international agree-
ments aimed at allowing the use of surcharges in place of quantitative
reduction as a balance of payments adjustment measure. This clause
reaffirms, in the broad context of all international trade agreements,
the policy set forth in Section 121(a)(6) as applicable to GATT. Nei-
ther the 1962 Act nor the Tariff Act itself included any provision
which clearly and explicitly gave the President the authority to im-
pose an import surcharge if monetary conditions made such an impo-
sition desirable. President Nixon did impose a temporary import sur-
charge in 1971,125 relying on certain generally worded provisions of the
Tariff Act and of the 1962 Act. The Customs Court has recently held,
however, that the President did not have authority under those acts
to impose this surcharge.' 6 Section 122(a) and (d) seem to require
amendment of GATT.
Title IV of the Administration Proposal contained provisions to
remedy the apparent lack of authority referred to above and to au-
thorize the President to take discriminatory action against a country
which has large or persistent balance of payment surpluses.
Section 123. Compensation Authority
This Section permits the President to enter into a trade agreement
in order to provide compensation to a foreign country if the President
has extended import relief under Section 203 and the import relief
has adversely affected the foreign country in question. Section123(b)
provides that no rate of duty may be decreased below a rate which is
70 percent "of the existing rate of duty" and further provides that the
new concessions shall be reduced and terminated according to sub-
stantially the same time schedule applicable to the import relief.
Subsection (d) provides, however, that new concessions to be granted
as compensation shall be granted under the general authority dele-
gated under Section 101 "until such authority terminates."'' 2 The
1962 Act contained no section dealing specifically with compensa-
tion; the President relied on Section 201128 of that Act to provide
compensation. Section 123 of the Trade Act, even after the modifica-
payments surplus, we can expect other countries to raise this point against us, and,
indeed, France has already done so.
"I Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971).
' Yoshida Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Ct. Cust. 1974).
121 The intent seems to be that the President is not to use the "emergency author-
ity" until he has exhausted the general authority given by Section 101, and is not to
enter into any compensation agreement after the five year period set out in Section
101 has elapsed. See SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 90.
In 19 U.S.C. § 1821 (1971); see SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 89.
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tions made by the Congress, seems to give the President sudstantial
additional authority beyond that granted by the 1962 Act.
Secton 124. Authority to Renegotiate Duties
This subsection, which permits additional trade agreements to be
negotiated in the 2 year period following the five year period author-
ized by Section 101, is designed principally to permit the orderly
correction of various small errors, omissions, or inconsistencies which
are almost certain to occur in the negotiation of any agreements so
detailed and so complicated as the multilateral tariff negotiations.'
29
The authority is also desirable as it permits changes due to a change
in circumstances. No such provisions was included in the 1962 Act;
but the Administration's proposal was accepted by the Congress, the
authority being limited by Section 124(b) and (c).
Section 125. Termination and Withdrawal Authority
Section 125 requires that any trade agreement entered into under
the provisions of the Trade Act shall be subject to termination or
withdrawal at the end of a period of not more than thred years, and
thereafter it is terminable on six months notice. The President is also
authorized to terminate in whole or in part any proclamation made
under the Trade Act. Up to this point, the Section is identical in
substance to Section 255 of the 1962 Act.'
3
The 1962 Act does not give the President explicit authority to raise
tariffs pursuant to the rights or obligations of the United States under
international trade agreements whenever the United States suspends
or withdraws concessions or terminates the agreement. Under the
1962 Act, the only authority given to the President in this regard was
the general authority contained in Section 255(b) and Section
201(a) (2). Probably in order to prevent future litigation (such as the
Yoshida International case' 3 in the balance of payments area), the
Administration Proposal requested specific authority to raise tariffs
in this situation.32 The Administration Proposal also requested that
the President be given authority to maintain existing rates of duties
after a trade agreement is terminated, 3 3 citing the potential problem
when Venezuela announced its intention to cancel its bilateral trade
'2' See SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 91.
'1' Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. 87-794, § 255, 76 Stat. 880 (1962).
'' See note 126 supra.
' See Administration Proposal § 402(a).
"3 See Id., § 402(b).
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agreement with the United States. 3 1 In such event, without the pro-
posed provision, it could have been argued that customs duties on oil
imported from Venezuela would have risen automatically to the
much higher preagreement rate.
In subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), of this Section Congress gives
the Administration the authority which it had requested, but subject
to certain limitations. Under subsection (c), when the U.S. takes the
initiative and withdraws, suspends, or terminates concessions, the
President is authorized to increase duties (not above the level permit-
ted by Section 101(c) of the Trade Act, or to impose other import
restrictions. Under subsection (d), when a foreign country takes the
initiative and withdraws, modifies, or suspends concessions granted
to the United States under trade agreements without granting due
compensation, the President is authorized to withdraw substantially
equivalent concessions and to increase duties (without any specified
limit) or impose other import restrictions in order to effect adequate
compensation. Subsection (e) provides that notwithstanding the ter-
mination of any trade agreement or the withdrawal of the United
States from such an agreement, these existing duties or other import
restrictions shall continue in effect for one year unless the President
specifically provides by proclamation that "such rates" shall be res-
tored to the pre-existing level. The President is to inform Congress,
within 60 days after termination of, or withdrawal from, a trade
agreement, as to what rates of duty he considers appropriate for the
future for the articles covered by the termination or withdrawal. Pub-
lic hearings are to be held by the President as to action taken or to
be taken under subsections (c), (d), and (e).
One question which may arise under subsection (e) is whether the
President has the right to provide by proclamation that import re-
strictions, as well as customs duties, shall be restored to the level at
which they would be but for the agreement. Another question is
whether subsections (d) and (e) are mutually exclusive.' 3 Both of
these questions are as yet unanswered.
' Id. at 98.
' The authority given to the President by § 125(e) is clearly more limited and
precise than the authority given to him under § 125(c) or (d).
1976]
376 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
Section 126. Reciprocal Non-Discriminatory Treatment
The Administration Proposal contained a most-favored-nation
clause, 3 ' identical in substance to that"7 of the 1962 Act, which
stated that unless otherwise provided by the Trade Act, any duty or
other import restriction or duty-free treatment proclaimed in carry-
ing out any agreement under the Trade Act should apply to products
of all foreign countries. The Ways and Means Committee accepted
the Administration Proposal substantially as written, pointing out
that the most-favored-nation principle was the cornerstone of
GATT. 3 ' Section 126(a) retains intact the most-favored-nation
clause, but the Senate Finance Committee, by adding Sections
126(b), (c), and (d), has qualified the most-favored-nation principle.
The Senate Finance Committee believed, however, that the "uncon-
ditional" most-favored-nation principle had led in the past to one-
sided agreements. It pointed out that under the multi-lateral negotia-
tions, it has been possible for countries to take almost no meaningful
part in the negotiations, making no concessions as to their own tariff
barriers or non-tariff barriers, while at the same time, as a result of
the most-favored-nation principle, they receive a multitude of con-
cessions.3 9 The Committee believed that a major industrialized coun-
try should not receive benefits from the United States unless it has
extended reciprocal concessions, or "reciprocal non-
discrimination."'' 40
Thus, Section 126(b) requires the President to determine, after
the conclusion of all negotiations under the Trade Act or at the end
of the five-year period beginning on the date of enactment, whichever
is earlier, whether any major industrial country has failed to make
concessions under trade agreements entered into under the Trade Act
"which provide competitive opportunities for the commerce of the
United States in such country substantially equivalent to the com-
' See Administration Proposal § 407.
'7 See 1 U.S.C. § 1881 (1971).
'' See HWMC REPORT, supra note 21, at 35.
13, SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 94.
"0 In effect, the SFC Report seems to say that the United States should return to
the "conditional" most-favored-nation approach which the United States had followed
for a number of years prior to 1924. In that year the United States and Germany
entered into an agreement containing an "unconditional" most-favored-nation clause.
The effect of that clause is considered in John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 104 F.2d
67 (C.C.P.A. 1939). The opinion sets out a communication from Secretary of State
Charles E. Hughes to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
relation to the most-favored-nation clause. Id. at 71-73. This communication is an
admirable statement of the background of that clause and the reasons for supporting
it.
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petitive opportunities, provided by the United States .... " "Major
industrial countries" are defined to include Canada, Japan, the EEC,
each member state of the EEC, and other countries designated by the
President. If the President determines that reciprocal concessions
have not been made by one of these major industrial countries, he is
to recommend to the Congress, under subsection (c), legislation pro-
viding for the withdrawal or non-applicability of concessions made by
the United States to such country, either in whole or in part.
It seems that whether or not one agrees in general with the concept
of "reciprocal nondiscriminatory treatment," the ex post facto aspect
of subsections (b) and (c) are extremely unfortunate. From the stand-
point of our trading partners, this clause will probably seem an arbi-
trary and high-handed approach. In effect, it says that the United
States, after it has negotiated for several years and signed a formal
agreement, intends to review all that has gone before and determine
whether it has made a good deal with respect to each major indus-
trialized country. If not, the United States will opt out, despite the
fact that the agreements have been signed. A provision requiring the
President to review the agreements as negotiated before signing or
authorizing the signing of the agreements, to ascertain whether the
requirement of reciprocal non-discriminatory treatment is met,
would seem to be a much more reasonable approach to the problem.
Section 127. Reservation of Articles for National Security or Other
Reasons
In general, Section 127 continues in effect the provisions of Sec-
tion 232 of the 1962 Act. The 1962 Act is supplemented by a para-
graph in Section 127(b)' 4' which provides that the President shall
reserve from negotiations seeking a reduction in duties or other im-
port restrictions under the Trade Act any article while there is in
effect with regard to such article an action taken under Section 203
of the Trade Act or Sections 232 and 351 of the 1962 Act.
Chapter 3-Hearings and Advice Concerning Negotiations
The Administration Proposal in dealing with hearings and advice
followed very closely the provisions12 of the 1962 Act, except that the
enactment of the Federal Advisory Committee Act' in 1972 caused
"I The comparable provision of the 1962 Act was Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. 87-
794, § 225, 76 Stat. 876.
142 Id., §§ 221-24, 76 Stat. 874-75.
"1 Act of Oct. 6, 1972, Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770, enacting 5 U.S.C. App. I
(Supp. IV 1975).
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the Administration to propose certain exemptions from the provisions
of that Act. Partly as a result of various amendments made by Con-
gress in other portions of the Trade Act, and partly as a result of the
desire of Congress to assure that the private sector be given a greater
opportunity to communicate its views to the STR, Congress substan-
tially expanded these provisions of the Administration Proposal.
Section 131. International Trade Commission Advice
Because the functions of the old Tariff Commission are substan-
tially expanded by the Trade Act, Congress changed the Commis-
sion's name to the "United States International Trade Commis-
sion." ' Under the provisions of Section 131, the President is required
to publish and furnish the Commission with lists of articles which
may be considered for a change in tariff or excise tax treatment. The
Commission is then required, within 6 months, to advise the Presi-
dent of the probable economic effect ot these changes, both on the
U.S. industries concerned and on consumers. The "effect on consum-
ers" is a change from the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Commis-
sion may also include a recommendation as to the desirability of a
"staging" period longer than the minimum required by Section
109(a) and is required to make investigations and furnish advice to
the President, as required by him, in regard to the probable economic
effect of modifications of non-tariff barriers. This is an example of the
expansion in function of the Commission.' Section 13(d) details the
steps to be followed by the Commission and the matters to be covered
in the advice furnished by the Commission to the President pursuant
to (b) or (c). The Commission is required, in preparing its advice, to
hold public hearings. In 1975, for the first time the Commission
elected to hold public hearings throughout the country in order to
give the public a better opportunity to attend and participate in the
hearings.
"I The change in name is formally accomplished by § 171; the expansion of the
functions of the Commission will be discussed under § 171. It is referred to in the Trade
Act as the "International Trade Commission," or "the Commission," but to avoid any
possibility that it be regarded as an international body representing a group of coun-
tries, the International Trade Commission prefers to be known by its full title, the
"United States International Trade Commission."
"I The 1962 Act, Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 876, required the
President to advise the Commission of articles as to which there might be a change in
tariffs "or other import restrictions." (emphasis added). However, the great increase
in emphasis in the Trade Act on nontariff barriers to trade will surely mean that the
Commission's functions in this area will be expanded.
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Section 132. Other Governmental Advice
The President is required to seek information and advice with
respect to the proposed international agreements from the Depart-
ments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State and
the Treasury, and from the STR.
Section 133. Public Hearings
The President is required to appoint an agency which is to hold
public hearings so as to afford "any interested person" an opportun-
ity to present his views as to the articles which are or should be
under consideration for a change in tariff treatment. Pursuant to this
authority, the President designated the Office of the STR to hold the
public hearings.
Section 134. Prerequisites for Offer
The President is authorized to make an "offer"' 46 for change in
tariff treatment or import restrictions with respect to a particular
article only after he has received a summary of the public hearings
to be held under Section 133 and advice from the Commission. If the
Commission has not furnished advice within the 6-month period re-
ferred to above, the President may proceed to make an offer.
Section 135. Advice from The Private Sector
This Section has been greatly expanded from the brief treatment
contained in Section 241(b) 47 of the 1962 Act. The 1962 Act provided
for a single advisory committee with 30 to 45 members. The Trade
Act provides a much more elaborate group of committees:
(a) An "Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations" to pro-
vide "overall policy advice" to be composed of not more than
45 individuals, including representatives of government, labor,
industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retail-
' The Administration Proposal states that "offer" is used here in the sense of a
"formal offer," acceptance of which would bind the United States to include such a
concession in a trade agreement, and that the Section would not prevent the STR from
beginning informal negotiations before receipt of advice from the Commission. Admin-
istration Proposal at 70.
"I Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. 87-794, § 241(b), 76 Stat. 878. Pursuant to that
subsection, President Johnson issued an Executive Order establishing a "Public Advi-
sory Committee on Trade Negotiations," Exec. Order No. 11, 143, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1964-
65), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,159, 3 C.F.R. 211 (1964-65).
1976]
380 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
ers, consumer interests, and the general public is required. The
inclusion of representatives from "small business, service in-
dustries, retailers, and consumer interests" is a change from
the 1962 Act.
(b) The President is authorized also to appoint general policy
advisory committees for industry, labor, and agriculture,
respectively.
(c) The President is required to establish "such industry,
labor or agriculture product sector advisory committees" as he
determines to be necessary for negotiation of the trade agree-
ments under Sections 101 or 102. The Act does not specify the
number of sector committees to be appointed.'4 8 The commit-
tees are to deal with both tariff adjustments and NTM's affect-
ing international trade. Recall that Section 102(g)(3) states
that for purposes of that Section international trade includes
"service industries." Service industries are understood to in-
clude insurance, banking and transportation.' These product
sector committees are to meet before and during negotiations,
at the call of the STR, to provide policy advice on negotiations
and technical advice and information on negotiations on par-
ticular products, both domestic and foreign.
Section 135(e)(1) and (2) requires that the Advisory Committee
for Trade Negotiations, each appropriate policy advisory committee,
and each product sector advisory committee furnish two sets of re-
ports. The first set of reports is to be furnished "at the conclusion of
negotiations for each trade agreement entered into under the Act."
It may be intended that this report be furnished prior to the execution
of the Trade Agreement in question, but this seems doubtful.'50
The first set of reports from the Advisory Committee for Trade
Negotiations and from the policy advisory committees are to be fur-
nished to the President, the STR, and to Congress, and are to include
an "advisory opinion" as to whether and to what extent each agree-
ment promotes the economic interests of the United States. The first
set of reports from the product sector committees are to be furnished
"I HWMC REPORT, supra note 21, at 38, states, owever, that no more than "30
or so" of these sector committees need be established. In fact, twenty-six product
sector advisory committees have been established.
"' SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 102.
,5 The House Conference Report, H. CONF. R. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7375, in describing this section of
the Act, states that each committee is "to meet at the conclusion of each trade agree-
ment entered into under the Act" (emphasis added), which would perhaps indicate
that the reports are intended to deal with the completed agreement.
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to the same recipients and are to include an advisory opinion as to
whether each trade agreement provides for equity and reciprocity
within the product sector.
The second set of reports is to be furnished to Congress by each
of the above-mentioned committees at the end of the five year period
starting with the date of the enactment of the Trade Act. Each such
report is to include much the same sort of advisory opinions as set
forth above, but these reports are to deal with all of the trade agree-
ments entered into under the Trade Act, taken as a whole."'"
There are three types of "confidential information" which the
Trade Act attempts to protect. These include (a) meetings of the
general policy advisory committees and of the product sector advisory
committees dealing with the negotiating objectives of the United
States Government in relation to trade agreements, (b) information
submitted in confidence by the private sector, and (c) information
submitted in confidence by employees or officials of the United
States to any of the advisory committees. In order to appreciate these
provisions, it is necessary to consider not only the provisions of the
Trade Act itself, but also those of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act'5 2 and of the Freedom of Information Act.5 3
The Federal Advisory Committee Act, enacted in 1972, was
passed, partly as a housekeeping measure, in an effort to keep track
of and to prevent the proliferation of advisory committees.'5 In addi-
tion, this Act was to assure that, subject to certain exceptions, federal
advisory committee meetings would be open to the public, that infor-
mation submitted to or prepared for or by each federal advisory com-
mittee would be open to the public, that the committees would main-
tain records of their meetings which also would be open to the public,
"I Since it appears that both sets of committee reports are perhaps to be prepared
only after the trade agreements are signed, one may appropriately speculate as to their
usefulness to the STR. Since Congress will be reviewing each trade agreement dealing
with NTM's, it appears that the first set of reports might be available to it before it is
required to act on the agreement. Insofar as the STR is concerned, it is possible that
Congress required these reports in an effort to make sure that the STR gave due
consideration to each of the various recommendations put forth by the committees.
After all, if the person responsible for adopting or refusing a recommendation knows
that he will be required to publish the reasons for not accepting the recommendation,
he is apt to think twice before disregarding any such recommendations. Section 135(i)
provides that the report to be furnished by the President under § 163 shall include a
report on the consultations with the advisory committees and the reasons for not
accepting advice or recommendations.
152 5 U.S.C. App. 1 (Supp. IV 1975).
'' 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1975).
"' 5 U.S.C. App. I (Supp. IV 1975). It is a bit ironic that this single piece of
legislation-the Trade Act, supra note 1-will set up approximately 37 advisory com-
mittees.
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and that copies of reports of committees, and background material,
where appropriate, be sent to the Library of Congress. 115 Both Con-
gress5  and the Administration 5 7 recognized that specific reference to
that Act should be made in the Trade Act.
The Freedom of Information Act, enacted in 1967, was passed in
an effort to assure that "agencies" of the United States would act
openly,'58 publishing the rules under which they operate, both proce-
dural and substantive, final opinions made in the adjudication of
cases, and statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the Agency. Subsection (b) of Section 552 provides, how-
ever, that the Section does not apply to matters that are "(1) specifi-
cally required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy; . . . (3) specifically excepted
from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and commercial or finan-
cial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential
." Sections 553 (Rulemaking) and 554 (Adjudications) amplify
the provisions of Section 552, but Section 553 excepts foreign affairs
functions of the United Sates and Section 554 exempts matters in-
volving the conduct of foreign affairs functions. Perhaps in view of the
provisions of Section 552(b) and the above-mentioned provisions of
Sections 553 and 554, the Administration and the Congress seem to
have concluded that Section 552 would not require disclosure of the
matters now under consideration, and that therefore no specific refer-
ence to the Freedom of Information Act need be made.
Section 135(f) of the Trade Act provides that he Federal Advisory
Committee Act shall apply to the Advisory Committee for Trade
Negotiations and to all other advisory committees established under
Section 135. A major exception is that the meetings of these other
advisory committees (the general policy advisory committees and the
product sector advisory committees) which are determined'5 by the
President or his designee as likely to deal with the negotiating objec-
tives or bargaining positions of the United States in the trade agree-
ment negotiations shall be exempt from subsections (a) and (b) of
Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.'
5 U.S.C. App. I §§ 10, 11, 13 (Supp. IV 1975).
" SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 103.
's Administration Proposal, § 112(b).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1971) and (2) (Supp. IV 1975).
'5, The SFC Report states that it is anticipated that "one determination could be
issued for all future meetings on that subject." SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 103.
11 Section 10 relates to open meetings, public notice and public participation.
Section 11 provides for public availability of documents-copies of transcripts of advi-
sory committee meetings.
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Section 10(a)(1) and (3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
provides that meetings of these committees are to be open to the
public and interested persons shall be permitted to appear before and
file statements with the committees. Section 10(d) provides,
however, that Sections 10(a)(1) and (3) are not to apply to any such
meeting if the President or the head of the agency determines that
the meeting is concerned with matters listed in Section 552(b) of Title
5, referred to above. Section 10(d) also provides, however, that if such
a determination is made, the advisory committee shall issue a report
at least annually setting forth a summary of its activities, consistent
with the policy of Section 552(b) of Title V. Thus, even as to meetings
of the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, an executive
order could possibly be issued directing that certain of its meetings
were not to be open to the public and that interested persons were
not free to attend these meetings.'"' Furthermore, Section 10(b) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act requires that subject to Section 552
of Title 5, records, reports and minutes of the advisory committees
be open to public inspection. Section 10(c) requires that detailed
minutes of each meeting of each advisory committee be kept and that
they contain a complete and accurate description of matters dis-
cussed and conclusions reached.
Several important points in respect to Section 135 and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act should be noted. Since the provisions
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act are to apply to the Advisory
Committee for Trade Negotiations' 2 it surely would be unwise, in the
absence of a protective executive order, for that committee to con-
sider any matters, the disclosure of which would compromise the
negotiating objectives or bargaining positions of the United States in
the multilateral trade negotiations because its meetings are open to
the public and the minutes of its meetings and documents submitted
to this committee are required to be furnished to the public. Further-
more, as indicated above, even if an Executive Order were to be
issued, it seems possible that a court would find that Congress had
impliedly removed the general power of the President or his designee
"I But cf. Nader v. Dunlop, 370 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1973). In this case the court
held that the Cost of Living Council could not by Executive order close all or substan-
tially all of its meetings to the public.
Furthermore, the fact that the Trade Act specifically provides that the Federal
Advisory Committee Act should apply to the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia-
tion may well be considered to prevent the President or his designee from issuing an
Executive Order providing for confidentiality.
,, Trade Act § 135(f)(1).
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under Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to make
exceptions to this situation by Executive Order.
The exception provided in Section 135(f) in connection with gen-
eral policy advisory committees and product sector advisory commit-
tees applies only to meetings of these committees. Thus it would be
unwise for these committees to act by letters since they might not fall
within the exception. Furthermore, the exception does not mention
Section 13 of theFederal Advisory Committee Act which provides
that subject to Section 552 of Title 5, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall provide eight copies of each report
prepared by an advisory committee to the Library of Congress, and
when appropriate, "background papers prepared by consultants."
However, Section 552(b) (3) provides that Section 552 shall not apply
to matters that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by stat-
ute." Probably a court would hold that in the light of Section
552(b)(3), Section 13 would not be applicable to the reports of these
committees, at least as to those portions of the reports dealing with
the negotiating objectives or bargaining positions noted in the excep-
tion to Section 135(f) of theTrade Act.
Section 135(g) (1) (A) and (B) of the Trade Act deals with informa-
tion submitted in confidence by the private sector. Section 552(b)(4)
of Title V provides that that Section shall not apply to trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential. The effect of Section 135(g)(1)(A) and (B)
is that "trade secrets and commercial or financial information which
is privileged or confidential" submitted in confidence by the private
sector is to be disclosed only to officers and employees of the United
States designated by the STR, to certain members of Congress and
to certain members of the staffs of the two congressional commit-
tees concerned, and not to any of the advisory committees. "Other
information" submitted in confidence by the private sector is to be
disclosed to the persons described above and to the appropriate advi-
sory committees.
It should be noted that Section 552(b) (4) provides that that Sec-
tion does not apply to matters that are "trade secrets and commercial
or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential." The quoted language is almost identical with that con-
tained in Section 135(g)(1)(A), and the effect of this appears to be
that "other" information submitted in confidence by the private sec-
tor is not within the exemption of Section 552(b) (4). Thus, any such
"other" information submitted in confidence by the private sector
and presented, either by the private sector or by officials or employees
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of the United States, to the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia-
tions seems to be subject to the full disclosure provisions of the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act. The provisions of Section 135(f)(2) do
not apply to this committee, and the information is not within the
exemption of Section 552(b) (4). Accordingly, it would seem advisable
that members of the private sector submit such "other" confidential
information only to the general policy advisory committees or to the
product sector advisory committees or to officials or employees of the
United States, with the understanding that such information will not
be passed on to the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations. In
view of the foregoing situation, the private sector may be tempted to
characterize all or most of the information submitted by it in confid-
ence as either "trade secrets" or as "commercial or financial informa-
tion which is privileged and confidential," to the maximum extent
that these characterizations may reasonably be employed; unfortun-
ately, the effect of this designation would be to make it unavailable
to the advisory committee concerned.
Section 135(g)(2) provides that information submitted in confid-
ence by officers or employees of the United States to any of the
advisory committees established under Section 135(b) and (c), in-
cluding the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, shall not be
disclosed, except as provided in rules issued by the STR, and the
Secretary of Labor, Commerce or Agriculture, as appropriate, after
consultation with the policy advisory committees and the product
sector committees. The Section also provides, however, that the rules
to be established shall, to the maximum extent feasible, permit
"meaningful consultation by members of the advisory committes
with persons affected by the proposed trade agreements." The STR
is to inform the advisory committees of significant issues and devel-
opments, both before and during negotiations. Furthermore,
although the STR is not bound by the advice or recommendations of
the advisory committees, the STR is to inform the committees "of
failures to accept such advice or recommendations," and the Presi-
dent is required to include in his annual report to Congress a report
of the STR stating the reasons for not accepting the advice or recom-
mendations."3 Section 135(j) also directs the President, entirely apart
from the advisory committees, to provide an opportunity for informal
10 This provision of the Trade Act is generally consistent with the more general
requirement set forth in the Federal Advisory Committee Act § 6 (Supp. IV 1975),
which requires the President to inform Congress stating "his proposals for action or
his reasons for inaction, with respect to the recommendation contained in the public
report" of the advisory committee in question.
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submission, on a confidential basis by interested parties, of data and
policy recommendations.
In summary, it can be said that if the STR and his staff fully
implement the provisions of this Chapter, they will no doubt receive
a torrent of advice and information from many diverse and conflicting
sources. It is to be devoutly hoped that after complying with these
elaborate provisions, the STR and his staff will have sufficient time
and opportunity left to digest the advice and information furnished
to them, to develop coherent, logical and effective negotiating objec-
tives, and to establish the methods by which these objectives are to
be pursued.'64
Chapter 4. Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations
Under the Trade Act, the STR will continue to have the same
rank (ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary) as under the
1962 Act. However, Congress expanded substantially the other provi-
sions of the 1962 Act with respect to his position, organization, and
responsibilities, as follows:
(a) Office of STR: the STR will be the head of the office of
the STR. That office is established by the Trade Act as a part
of the Executive Office of the President. (Sec. 141(a))' 65
(b) Two Deputy STR's: the STR is to have two Deputy
STR's, each having the rank of ambassador. The STR and his
two Deputies are to be appointed by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate. (Section 141(b)(1) and (2)).
(c) Responsibilities: Under the 1962 Act, the only responsi-
bilities especially assigned to the STR was to act as the chief
representative of the United States in negotiations under the
Trade Agreement subchapter of that act and to serve as chief
of the interagency organization established under 19 U.S.C.A.
1872. Under the Trade Act, the STR retains these responsibili-
ties, but new responsibilities are added by the Trade Act, and
I" Most of these advisory committees have already been established, with notice
of their appointment appearing in the Federal Register, but the top advisory commit-
tee, the "Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations" had not been selected as of
August 15, 1975.
"I See Exec. Order No. 11, 846, 40 Fed. Reg. 14291 (1975), setting out the responsi-
bilities and authorities of the STR and creating the Trade Policy Committee, the inter-
agency committee provided for in § 242 of the 1962 Act as amended by § 602(b) of the
Trade Act, supra note 1.
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he is now to have direct relations with Congress, as well as with
the President. His chief responsibilities are:' 6
(i) acts as chief representative of the United States for
each trade negotiation under Title I of the Trade Act
(which encompasses the first seven chapters of the
Trade Act) and under Section 301 of theTrade Act
(which deals with actions to be taken to provide relief
from injury caused by import competition).
(ii) Reports directly to, and is responsible to, the Pres-
ident and Congress with respect to trade programs
under the 1962 Act, the Trade Act, and Section 350 of
the Tariff Act of 1930.167
(iii) Advises the President and Congress with respect
to NTB's, international commodity agreements, and
other matters which are related to the trade agreements,
and
(iv) Makes reports to Congress with respect to the
matters described in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above.
The objective of Congress in making these changes is clearly
stated by the HWMC Report:
[Y]our committee, in establishing the Office of the Special
Trade Representative, is reaffirming its belief that a strong
and independent office, headed by a Government official re-
porting directly to the President and responsible to the Con-
gress, is the best means of assuring that in trade policy matters
the United States is speaking with one strong voice on behalf
of the executive branch and that positions taken accurately
reflect the intent of Congress.'68
The amendments in respect to the position and responsibilities of the
STR, like those in respect of the Commission, show the desire of the
Congress to obtain a more direct supervisory position in relation to
the trade agreements program than it has previously had.
I" Exec. Order No. 11,846, 40 Fed. Reg. 14291 (1975), sets out in much greater
detail the responsibilities of the STR. A review of that order is desirable (a) as estab-
lishing the many tasks to be performed by the STR and (b) as a cross-study of the
wide range of subjects dealt with by the Trade Act.
1" 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1971).
'u HWMC REPORT, supra note 21, at 40.
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Chapter 5: Congressional Procedures with respect to Presidential
Actions
In discussing Section 102 of the Trade Act, it was pointed out that
that Section provided that any trade agreement dealing with NTM's
would take effect only if an "implementing bill" is enacted into law.
As pointed out in the earlier discussion, the Administration Proposal
had requested broad authority in regard to NTM's, and had also
recommended that the Trade Act permit a trade agreement dealing
with NTM's to go into effect unless vetoed by either house of Con-
gress within a given period. The Administration supported this re-
quest by arguing that our trading partners would be unwilling to
enter into prolonged negotiations with the United States in regard to
NTM's if they could reasonably expect (a) that Congress would in-
sist, as a condition of its approval, upon a large number of amend-
ments in a trade agreement already negotiated by the STR, and/or
(b) that the consideration and approval of any such trade agreement
by the United States Congress would mean very substantial delay.
The Administration's "veto" proposal was an effort to meet both of
these points.
The House went along with the "veto" approach contained in the
Administration Proposal, but the Senate considered that this ap-
proach would constitute an improper delegation of legislative author-
ity by Congress. However, Sectionl5l of the Trade Act does attempt
to protect against any effort to amend the proposed trade agreement
by Congress, and to assure that both Houses of Congress will take
action upon the proposed implementing bill within a specified period
of time.'69 Section 151 also deals with congressional action in regard
to commercial agreements with countries not currently receiving non-
discriminatory treatment. 7 '
Section 152 deals with any congressional resolution disapproving
the action taken by the President in regard to import relief from
injury caused by import competition or disapproving actions taken
by the President in response to foreign restrictive trade practices or
export subsidies if these actions are taken against any foreign country
other than the country improving the restrictive trade practice or
granting the export subsidies.
"' A somewhat similar provision was included in one of the earlier trade agree-
ment acts. Act of Aug. 20, 1958, Pub. L. 85-686, § 6, 72 Stat. 676 (1958). Bills or
resolutions which are given the benefit of this "special handling" are sometimes called
"procedurally privileged."
110 This subject is dealt with in detail in Title IV of theTrade Act, supra note 1.
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Finally, Section 153 deals with any congressional resolution relat-
ing to the extension of the waiver authority granted to the President
under Section 402 of the Trade Act dealing with trade relations with
countries not currently receiving nondiscriminatory treatment. The
President is granted authority'7 ' to waive, during the period of eight-
een months beginning on the date of enactment of the Trade Act,
certain provisions of the Trade Act in relation to the countries speci-
fied above; but if he wishes to extend the waiver beyond this period,
the extension of the waiver must be submitted to Congress for ap-
proval.' 2
Chapter 6. Congressional Liaison and Reports
Section 243 of the1962 Act provided that the President should
appoint, upon the recommendation of the respective presiding officer
of each House of Congress, two members of the House Ways and
Means Committee and two members of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, who shall be accredited as members of the United States delega-
tion to the negotiations. The Administration Proposal would have
retained this Section in effect.'13 Congress, however, wished to expand
the number of members and clarify their role.
Section 161 of the Trade Act provides that the number of Congres-
sional advisors be expanded from four to ten, five from each of the
committees above noted, who are to be accredited by the President,
upon the recommendation of the presiding officer of each House, as
"official advisors to the United States delegation to international
conferences, meetings and negotiation sessions relating to trade
agreements."'7 4 The STR is required to keep each official advisor
currently informed as to U.S. negotiating objectives, status of nego-
tiations, and of any proposed changes in domestic law which may be
recommended to Congress to carry out the trade agreements. The
chairman of each of these two committees may designate additional
members of the committee and of its staff who shall have access to
the information provided to the official advisors.
Section 162 requires the President to transmit to each House of
'' Trade Act, supra note 1, § 402(c)(1).
2 Id. § 402(d).
' No specific mention is made in the Administration Proposal to this § 243 but
§ 706 of the Administration Proposal (relative to other laws) would not have repealed
or amended § 243, thus leaving it in effect.
'" This wording does not clearly indicate whether the "official advisors" are to
attend the negotiating sessions and other meetings, but the HWMC Report, indicates
that it is expected that they will attend. HWMC REPORT, supra note 21, at 43.
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Congress a copy of each trade agreement as soon as it comes into
force, together with a statement'75 of his reasons for entering into the
agreement, bearing in mind the advice furnished by the Commission,
pursuant to Section 131 of the Trade Act. Furthermore, as under the
1962 Act, the President is required to submit an annual report to
Congress in regard to the trade program. However, the list of subjects
to be covered in this report under Section 163(a) of the Trade Act is
much more extensive and detailed than the list set forth in Section
402 of the 1962 Act, again showing the desire of Congress to be kept
more completely informed than in the past in regard to the foreign
trade programs and agreements. Finally, the Commission is to make
a "factual" report annually on the operation of the Trade Agreements
Program (This is a carry-over provision from the 1962 Act, Section
402). 1
76
Chapter 7. United States
International Trade Commission
As previously indicated, the former Tariff Commission has been
renamed "the United States International Trade Commission." Fur-
thermore, the Trade Act has expanded the functions of the Commis-
sion 77 and has strengthened the independence of the Commission by
making the following changes:
"I The SFC Report amplifies the information to be contained in the statement.
The statement must:
(i) give a factual discussion of the benefits of the agreement;
(ii) give specific information regarding tariff and nontariff barriers which may
remain in each product sector of manufacturing and in agriculture; and
(iii) state the success in meeting negotiating objectives.
SFC REPORT, supra note 4, at 114. The HWMC Report stresses the oversight
responsibilities of the House Ways and Means Committee, indicating that:
(a) the committee will hold frequent meetings of the full committee, to be
briefed on the progress of negotiations and trade policy, by its own staff, by a represent-
ative of the executive branch, and by its official advisors;
(b) it desires that the President's annual report, referred to below, be furnished
by March 31, and the Committee plans to hold public hearings on the report; and
(c) the Commission is to give priority to its own annual reports (see below).
HWMC REPORT, supra note 21 at 43.
175 "9 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (1970).
In Examples of some of the added responsibilities of the Commission are:
(a) Substantially increased responsibility under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
including (i) the determination of whether an unfair trade practice has been used in
the course of importing articles and (ii) passing upon the validity of patents for pur-
poses of determining whether to make relief available under § 341 of the Trade Act in
the case of unfair import practices.
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(a) Chairman and Vice Chairman. Previously, the President
had designated the Chairman and Vice Chairman each year.
Under the Trade Act, the most senior members become Chair-
man and Vice Chairman for a term of eighteen months (Sec-
tion 172(b)(2)).
(b) Term in office. Previously, the commissioners were ap-
pointed for six year terms and might be reappointed. Under
the Trade Act, the time of each incumbent commissioner is
extended for varying periods, ranging from 18 months to 4
years, but no commissioner who has served for more than five
years (excluding service before the enactment of the Trade
Act) is eligible for reappointment. Commissioners appointed
after the date of enactment of the Trade Act are to serve for a
period of nine years, but those appointed to fill vacancies only
serve out the predecessor's term. (Section 172(a)).
(c) Budget. The Commission is to have an independent
budget, not subject to revision by the President (Section 175).
(d) Representation in Court Proceedings and Authority -to
Apply for Subpoenas. Under the amendments contained in the
Trade Act, the Commission is to be represented in all judicial
proceedings by attorneys who are employees of the Commis-
sion, or at the request of the Commission, by the Attorney
General of the United States (Section 174) Similarly, the Com-
mission is now permitted to apply directly for the issuance of
subpoenas, rather than requesting the Attorney General to do
SO.
In addition to the above changes, the Trade Act requires that the
report to be made annually by the Commission to Congress is to be
(b) Increased responsibility in regard to hearings under the Anti-dumping Act
in regard to injury (§ 321).
(c) Responsibility to inquire into damage to industry resulting from bounties or
grants when the goods admitted are free of regular customs duties (§ 322).
(d) Responsibility in regard to import relief hearings (§ 201). The Commission
had somewhat the same responsibility under the 1962 Act, but the fact that under the
Trade Act, it will be much easier to establish a case that justifies import relief will
make the Commission's task vastly more important. Many more cases will be brought,
and it appears that it will be up to the Commission to determine whether adjustment
assistance will provide sufficient relief, or whether to recommend that administrative
import relief be given.
(e) Monitoring of East-West Trade (§ 410). Trade Act, supra note 1.
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expanded so as to list all votes taken by the Commission during the
year, showing those voting in the affirmative, those in the negative,
and those not voting.
7 8
Finally, in an effort to increase the prestige of the Commission
and aid in attracting able individuals, the positions of the members
of the Commission and that of its Chairman were moved to a higher
level on the Executive Schedule.
I'Ts The Senate-passed version of the bill required that the number of members of
the Commission be increased from six to seven, one reason given for the increase being
that in the recent past, the votes in the Commission had frequently resulted in a tie.
This provision was deleted in conference, "with an understanding that the commis-
sioners shall, to the maximum extent feasible, avoid tie votes." H.R. CONF. 1644, 93d
Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7378.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Administration Proposal ........ Trade Bill of 1973 as forwarded
by President Nixon to the
Congress on April 10, 1973
with related documents
ASP .......................... American Selling Price method
of valuation
Commission ................... United States International
Trade Commission
GATT ........................ General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
HWMC Report ................ Report of the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of
Representatives on the Trade
Act
MTN ......................... Multilateral trade negotiations
NTM's ....................... Nontariff barriers to or dis-
tortions of international
trade
OPEC ........................ Organization of Oil Exporting
Countries
SFC Report ................... Report of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate on
the Trade Act
STR .......................... Special Trade Representative
of the United States
the Trade Act ................. Trade Act of 1974
U.A ........................... Units of Account
VAT .......................... Value Added Tax
1962 Act ...................... Trade Expansion Act of 1962
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